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Introduction
Developments to law of contract have often been driven by new
methods of contracting. Early in the twentieth century, for example,
businesses began using preprinted forms for their purchase orders,
confirmations, invoices, packing slips, and other documents, on which they
included contract terms. That practice generated so-called battles of the
*
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forms, which gave rise to section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
Around the same time, companies selling to consumers began including
contract terms the backs of receipts, on parking stubs, and on cruise ship
tickets, and courts had to devise rules to determine the effectiveness of
these new techniques. Later, businesses began providing their customers
access to complete terms only after the sale, inside a shrink-wrapped box or
arriving in the mail with products ordered over the phone. Again courts had
to figure out how to handle this new form of contractual writing. In the
1990s, the Uniform Law Commission and legislatures responded to the new
computer technologies with laws establishing the legal equivalence of
electronic records and writings.1 More recently, clickwrap and browsewrap
have come to dominate online consumer contracts. Courts and
commentators are still working out the right rules for these technologies of
contracting.
The next chapter in this history is likely to involve smart contracts. A
smart contract is software, perhaps run on blockchain and designed to
execute future exchanges or other coordinated actions between persons
who might otherwise not trust one another to perform. Recent
advancements in blockchain technology have led to an explosion of
commercial interest in smart contracts. Blockchain computing platforms
like Etherium now allow users to lock themselves into smart contracts
without using third-party platforms, thereby enabling what some
characterize as “trustless” transactions.2 Investment vehicles built on such
smart contracts have attracted hundreds of millions of dollars in
cryptocurrency.3 And many are predicting more concrete applications in
areas like insurance, financial derivatives, consumer protection, corporate
governance, tax filing, voting, supply chain management, bankruptcy,
property rights, and repossession.4 An auto loan company, for example,
might use a smart contract to automatically lock the borrower out of the car
if payment is not received. An insurer might employ a smart contract to
make automatic payments to farmers based on temperature and rainfall
data. Or an avocado wholesaler and a trucking company might install
vibration sensors in the trucks connected to a smart contract that adjusts
payments up or down based on how bumpy the ride was.
Smart contracts interact in complex ways with legal contracts.
Enthusiasts have suggested that smart contracts might for some applications
1

Uniform Electronic Transactions Act; Electronic Signatures in Global and National
Commerce Act.
2
Blockchain technology is not central to the issues this article explores. Those
seeking an accessible introduction to the technology might begin with Kevin
Werbach & Nicolas Cornell, Contracts Ex Machina, 67 Duke L. J. 314, 319-38
(2017).
3
See, e.g., the discussion of The DAO in Part Five.
4
Shaanan Cohney & David Hoffman, Transactional Scripts in Contract Stacks, 105
Minn. L. Rev. 319, 321-22 (2020) (listing proposed uses and sources).
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eventually replace legal contracts. When and how that might happen raises
an interesting set of questions. More likely is that smart contracts will be
used in tandem with legal contracts. Before implementing a smart contract,
two businesses might enter into a legal contract governing its use. Or the
use of the smart contract itself might generates a legal contract. Here the
legal questions will involve whether and how the use of a smart contract
might affect the terms of a legal contract.
In the past few years, scholars have begun exploring the legal
implications of smart contracts.5 But these are still early days. One finds in
the literature disagreements on such a basic question as whether smart
contracts constitute promises or agreements, whether use of a smart
contract always produces a legal contract, and whether the code of a smart
contract comparable to a contractual writing.
This article is the first to systematically explore the relationship
between smart contracts and legal contracts. It argues that although smart
contracts are neither contractual writings nor legal contracts, they share
important features with each. First, a legal contract and a smart contract can
each serve as a tool to secure future performance in the absence of trust.
This is why some predict that the new technology will for some
applications come to replace the old. Whereas today an avocado
wholesaler and shipper might enter into a contractual agreement to adjust
the price based on damage to the produce, tomorrow they might lock
themselves into a smart contract.
Second, both contractual writings and the code in which smart
contracts are written have a lexical structure. Each can be read. And one
finds a similar conditional logic in each. The if-then structure of the
imagined smart contract for avocado shipments (if the ride is bumpy, then
the price is reduced) is similar to if-then structure of a contractual writing
designed to do the same job (“If the fruit is bruised, then the price is
reduced”). Smart contracts can look like contractual writings.
This second similarity has suggested to some that smart contract
code might figure into the construction of legal contracts in the way
contractual writings do. This article examines this idea, both in light of
contract law that exists today and with an eye to how that law might
evolve. The doctrinal question is threefold. First, when and how might the
use of a smart contract generate a legal contract? Second, when if ever
should the contents of a smart contract—especially the operational code,
but also programmer comments—figure into determining the content of an
associated legal contract? Third, when code is relevant to the construction

5

See the sources cited infra notes 18-22. See also Zvonimir Slakoper & Ian Tot,
Digital Technologies and the Law of Obligations (2019); Larry DiMatteo, Michael
Cannarsa & Cristina Poncibòo, The Cambridge Handbook of Smart Contracts,
Blockchain Technology and Digital Platforms (2020); Jason Allen & Peter Hunn,
Smart Legal Contracts: Computable Law in Theory and Practice (forthcoming).
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of a legal contract, how should courts interpret the code when determining
the parties’ legal relationship?
This article answers these questions using a series of thought
experiments. The term “smart contract” first appeared in Nick Szabo’s 1997
article, “Smart Contracts: Building Blocks for Digital Markets.” Szabo
suggests that “[a] canonical real-life example, which we might consider to
be the primitive ancestor of smart contracts, is the humble vending
machine.”6 A vending machine functions like a smart contract in that it
enables transactions—exchanges of money for a product—between
strangers who do not trust one another. Unlike a smart contract, however, a
vending machine need not employ computer code, and its internal
mechanisms might not have an obvious lexical structure. Several
imaginative variations on the familiar vending machine serve as thought
experiments to explore when and how the internal structure of a machine
might figure into the terms of a legal contract between those who use it.
Like the use of a vending machine, the use of a smart contract can
express one or both users’ agreement to a transaction, thereby giving rise to
a legal contract. In the large majority of smart-contract transactions, that
agreement will also be expressed in words—the most common medium for
contractual agreements. Those transactions pose no special formation
issues. It is also possible to imagine parties expressing their agreement
solely through the use of a smart contract, without an accompanying verbal
agreement—on the model of a vending-machine transaction. Any legal
contract that emerged from such a transaction would be an implied-in-factcontract. Although the construction of implied-in-fact contracts poses some
special challenges, smart contracts do not generate puzzles that are
different in kind from the construction of other legal contracts.
Scholars have recently begun to focus on how a smart contract’s
code might figure into the interpretation of a legal contract. But in what will
probably be the vast majority of smart-contract transactions, courts should
not look to the code when determining parties’ contractual obligations. This
is most obviously the case when one or both parties do not have access to
the code—in a “black-box smart contract.” As the use of smart contracts
expands, we are likely to see more and more black-box smart contracts. But
even when both users have access to the code—when they are using a
“glass-box smart contract”—it is not obvious that the code should figure int
the construction of any legal contracts between them. This article argues
that it should in only two, relatively narrow categories of transactions.
The first is when both users take a hand in the coding, producing
what I call a “mutually programmed smart contract.” In these instances,
code is best analogies to course of performance evidence. Such mutually
6

Nick Szabo, Smart Contracts: Building Blocks for Digital Markets, Extropy (1996),
available at:
http://www.fon.hum.uva.nl/rob/Courses/InformationInSpeech/CDROM/Literature/L
OTwinterschool2006/szabo.best.vwh.net/smart_contracts_2.html.
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programmed smart contracts, while interesting to think about, are expensive
to produce and will be rare.
More common will be transactions in which one user programs a
smart contract invites others to interact with it, or in which two users
purchase smart contract software from a third-party vendor. I term these
“smart contracts of adhesion.” When adhesive smart contracts are provided
to consumers or other unsophisticated parties, the code should not figure
into the interpretation of the associated legal contract, even if the business
makes the code available to users, and even if it stipulates that the code is
part of their agreement. Several scholars have suggested that between
sophisticated parties, the code of a glass-box smart contract should
automatically be treated as interpretive evidence of their legal contract. This
article argues against such a rule. When sophisticated parties use an
adhesive smart contract, the default should be that the code is not evidence
of their agreement—even if all parties have access to it. Sophisticates
should have the power to incorporate code into their agreement. But courts
should be wary of attempts to integrate code against natural language
evidence of the parties’ agreement.
The final doctrinal question concerns how courts should interpret
code. Because the operational code of a smart contract is different in kind
from a contractual writing, one should not assume that interpretive methods
that apply to the latter apply pari passu to the former. When a court
interprets a contractual writing, it seeks out the writing’s communicative
content—what its author or authors objectively intended to convey to a
reader. The legal interpretation of code, in distinction, focuses on its
design—what it was inteded to do. Here it is crucial to distinguish the
intended operation of a piece of software from its actual operation. Parties
who have agreed to the design of a piece of software have not necessarily
agreed to bugs in its operation.
This article concludes with a broader consideration of the relation
between smart contracts and legal contracts. Enthusiasts have claimed that
smart contracts are a means of having “private law without public
authority.”7 Such claims represent a misguided form of techno-utopianism,8
one that misunderstands both the nature of contractual relationships and
the functions of contract law.
Smart contracts, like vending machines, are designed to solve a
basic mistrust problem: parties do not always trust one another to perform.
The law of contracts can be used to solve that basic mistrust problem. But it
does much more than that. Contract law also addresses deception at the
time of formation, prevents opportunism, fills gaps in the parties’
7

James Grimmelman, All Smart Contracts Are Ambiguous, 2 J.L & Innovation 1, 2
(2019). To be clear, this is not Grimmelmann’s claim. He is describing the claims
of others.
8
See Julie E. Cohen, Internet Utopianism and the Practical Inevitability of the Law,
18 Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 85 (2019).
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agreement, and gives parties the flexibility they need to address unforeseen
circumstances or future disagreements. And contract law serves broader
social functions, such as marking breach as a moral wrong, enforcing
obligations of corrective justice, denying public support to agreements
society deems unfair or otherwise problematic, and providing a form of
civic participation through the courts. It is not obvious that a smart contract
could be designed to serve any of those other purposes, and highly unlikely
that a smart contract could ever serve all of them. Suggestions that code
might someday replace law rest on oversimplified and false pictures of
human sociability and of what law does.9 And parties are likely to do better
when they use smart contracts not to supplant, but to supplement their legal
contracts.
Part One of this article lays the conceptual groundwork for the
analysis that follows. It discusses various definitions of “smart contract” in
the literature, fixes on a useful one, and then identifies important
differences between smart contracts and contractual writings. Parts Two
through Four employ a series of thought experiments to explore when and
how the code of a smart contract might figure into the interpretation of an
associated legal contract. Part Two make the simple but often overlooked
point that when a smart contract is really like a standard vending machine,
whose internal mechanisms are hidden from the user, its code does not
affect the parties’ legal obligations. Part Three examines the idea of a
mutually programed smart contract. It argues inter alia that a smart contract
of this type can serve as something like course of performance evidence of
the parties’ legal contract, and that when it does, the salient interpretive
question is the code’s design, as distinguished from its operation. Part Four
examines smart contracts of adhesion, in which one party programs the
smart contract and gives it to the other with access to the code and on a
take-it-or-leave it basis. Here the analysis draws on the rules governing
standard contracts of adhesion, the enforcement of browsewrap terms, the
incorporation of extrinsic writings, and the integration of contractual
writings to examine when, if ever, the code of an adhesive smart contract
should figure into the content of a legal contract between its users. Part Five
draws on this doctrinal analysis to think more broadly about the optimal
9

This article focuses on the internal logic of the law, or on reasons cognizable
within legal discourse. Legal contracts are also woven into the broader fabric of
social life. They have meanings and functions that are not, in a narrow sense, legal
ones. For an excellent account of the limitations of smart contracts on that front,
see Karen E.C. Levy, Book-Smart, Not Street-Smart: Blockchain-Based Smart
Contracts and The Social Workings of Law, 3 Engaging Science, Technology, and
Society 1 (2017). This article’s thesis is the legal complement to Levy’s more
sociologically oriented one: that legal contracts “’work’ in a multitude of ways and
accomplish a multitude of aims [within the broader social and relational contexts
in which they appear] that are unaccounted for by the smart contract framework.”
Id. at 2.
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relationship between smart contracts and legal contracts, using as an
example the epic failure of an especially ambitious smart contract, known
simply as “The DAO.” It draws on contract theory to argue that smart
contracts, though useful tools, will never do the job of legal contracts or
contract law, and to diagnose the mistaken picture of contracting that
underlies the idea that they might.
This article employs a series of thought experiments, several of
which are fairly fanciful. This approach departs from the style and method
of the standard law review article. But thought experiments are hardly new
in legal scholarship—think of Oliver Wendell Holmes’s “bad man,”10 Lon
Fuller’s “Case of the Speluncean Explorers,”11 Meier Dan Cohen’s imagined
an “acoustic separation” between officials and the public,12 or Carol Rose’s
alternative narratives about the origins of property rights.13 Thought
experiments of this type serve two important functions. First, imaginative
variation can displace standard assumptions that lead to mistaken
conclusions. Because a vending machine need not employ code, thinking
through when if ever its internal mechanisms might affect a legal contract
between its operator and a user helps one think more clearly about when
the code of a smart contract might do the same. Second, thought
experiments can serve, in Daniel Dennett’s phrase, as intuition pumps.14 A
well-constructed thought experiment can push us to think about familiar
phenomena in new ways. I examine in considerable detail, for example, the
proper legal responses to standard vending machines, to a vending machine
that two engineers build and use together, and to a vending machine
encased in a glass box and installed in an engineering department. These
thought experiments, and the effort I expend analyzing them, might seem
odd, and sometimes even goofy. But their purpose is serious: to think
systematically about how a relatively new digital technology, smart
contracts, can and should interact with a well-established legal technology,
legal contracts. It turns out that the relationship between smart contracts
and legal contracts is a complex one. The thought experiments are designed
both to avoid easy answers and to identify important and often overlooked
doctrinal nuances. Only by getting those nuances right will it be possible to
fully understand how the law should respond to this new technology of
contracting.

10

Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457 (1897), reprinted
in 110 Harv. L. Rev. 991, 992 (1996-1997).
11
Lon L. Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 616 (1941).
12
Meier Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in
Criminal Law, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 625 (1984).
13
Carol M. Rose, Property as Storytelling: Perspectives from Game Theory,
Narrative Theory, Feminist Theory, 2 Yale J. L & Human. 37 (1990).
14
Daniel C. Dennett, Intuition Pumps and Other Tools for Thinking 1-15 (2013).
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1. Preliminary Remarks
“Contract” is a metonym.15 In some uses, the word denotes a
physical object: a writing that records two parties’ legally effective
agreement. In others, it denotes an abstract entity: a legal relationship
between persons resulting from an agreement between them. This is why
we can make sense of an infelicitous sentence such as, “Tearing up a
contract does not destroy the contract.” One might tear up the physical
thing without altering the associated legal relationships. To avoid
ambiguity, this article uses “contractual writings” to refer to contracts in the
first, more concrete sense and “legal contracts” to refer to contracts in the
second, more abstract one.
“Contract” is used with other meanings as well. In a game of bridge,
partners can “take the contract,” and a mobster might “put out a contract”
on someone. Taking a contract in bridge is unlikely to have legal
consequences. And although putting out a contract for murder can have
significant legal consequences, they are found in the criminal law, not in
the law of contracts.
Calling something a “smart contract” does not entail that it is either
a contractual writing or a legal contract.16 Shaanan Cohney and David
Hoffman therefore suggest relabeling smart contracts “transactional
scripts.”17 This article keeps with the more familiar nomenclature, but with
a warning not to assume that a smart contract qualifies as a contractual
writing or results in a legal contract. In fact, this article aims to unpack the
complex relationship between the three.
1.1

Smart Contracts

A challenge in making sense of the literature on smart contracts is
that scholars attach various meanings to the term.18 Many describe a smart
contract as a special form of promise or agreement. Thus Szabo defines
“smart contract” as “set of promises, specified in digital form, including

15

A metonym refers to one thing using a word for something closely associated
with it, as when one refers to the theater as “the stage” or a court as “the bench.”
Although this statement hardly requires authority, see Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld,
Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 Yale L.J.
16, 25 (1913); Arthur Linton Corbin, Offer and Acceptance, and Some of the
Resulting Legal Relations, 26 Yale Law Journal 169, 169 (1917); Karl Lewellyn
emphasizes the same point in his classic article, What Price Contract?—An Essay in
Perspective, 40 Yale L.J. 704, 707-08 (1931).
16
See infra note 21.
17
Cohney & Hoffman, supra note 4 at 323.
18
For another systematic account of various definitions, see Alexander Savelyev,
Contract Law 2.0: ‘Smart’ Contracts As the Beginning of the End of Classic Contract
Law, 26 Info. & Communications. Tech. L. 116, 120-28 (2017).
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protocols within which the parties perform on these promises.”19 More
common today are definitions that conceive of smart contracts as
automated agreements. Jason Allen, for example, defines “smart contract”
as an “automatable and enforceable agreement.”20 Some, though not all,
writers further assume that smart contracts are perforce also legal
contracts.21

19

Szabo, supra note 6 at 1 (emphasis added). See also J.G. Allen, Wrapped and
Stacked: “Smart Contracts” and the Interaction of Natural and Formal Language, 14
Eur. R. Contract L. 307, 319 (2018) (“[A] smart contract is a piece of text in a
formal language that purports to be both (i) a written instrument embodying and
recording contracting parties’ mutual promises with (ii) code that performs and/or
enforces those promises on a digital computer.”); Usha R. Rodrigues, Law and the
Blockchain, 104 Iowa L. Rev. 679, 698-99 (2019) (“[A] ‘smart contract’ generates
an automatically enforceable promise, but one available without recourse to the
law.”).
20
Allen, supra note 19 at 312-13; See also Grimmelmann, supra note 7 at 2
(describing smart contracts as “mechanisms that enforce agreements using software
rather than law”); ISDA, Legal Guidelines for Smart Derivatives Contracts:
Introduction 6 (January 2019) (“A smart contract is an automatable and enforceable
agreement.”); Stuart D. Levi & Alex B. Lipton, An Introduction to Smart Contracts
and Their Potential and Inherent Limitations, Harvard Law School Forum on
Corporate Governance 1 (posted May 26, 2018), available at:
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/05/26/an-introduction-to-smart-contractsand-their-potential-and-inherent-limitations/ (“’Smart contracts’ is a term used to
describe computer code that automatically executes all or parts of an agreement
and is stored on a blockchain-based platform.”); Levy, supra note 9 at 1-2 (“Smart
contracts are agreements that utilize the blockchain . . . to automatically and
securely execute obligations when certain conditions are met.”); Jeffrey J. Lipshaw,
The Persistence of “Dumb” Contracts, 2 Stan. J. Blockchain L. & Pol’y 1, 4 (2019)
(adopting a definition of “smart contract” as “computer code that automatically
executed agreed-upon transactions”); Scott A. McKinney, Rachel Landy, and
Rachel Wilka, Smart Contracts, Blockchain, and the Next Frontier of Transactional
Law, 13 Wash. J.L. Tech. & Arts 313, 321 (2018) (“At their base, smart contracts are
self-enforcing agreements that exchange promises or consideration between parties
based on a transparent set of rules using predefined inputs.”); Max Raskin, The Law
and Legality of Smart Contracts, 1 Geo. L. Tech. Rev. 305, 309 (2017) (“A smart
contract is an agreement whose execution is automated.”); Mark Verstraete, The
Stakes of Smart Contracts, 50 Loyola U. Chi. L.J. 743, 755 (2019) (“In the broadest
terms, a smart contract is a self-enforcing digital agreement.”); Werbach & Cornell,
supra note 2 at 328 (“[W]e define a smart contract as an agreement in digital form
that is self-executing and self-enforcing.”).
21
Allen, supra note 19 at 321-22 (arguing against distinguishing smart contracts
from legal contracts); Jeff Lingwall and Ramya Mogallapu, Should Code Be Law?
Smart Contracts, Blockchain, and Boilerplate, 88 UMKC L. Rev. 285, 298 (2019)
(“At heart, a smart contract is one in which part of a contract or the entire contract
is encoded and executed automatically via mechanical means or computer code.”);
McKinney et al., supra note 20 at 322-23 (“At the risk of stating the obvious, a
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All the above conceptions build social facts—agreement, promise,
legal contract—into the definition of “smart contract,” making it difficult to
tease out the relationship between code and law. In order to get at that
relationship, it is helpful to recognize that a smart contract is, first and
foremost, a piece of computer code. For the purposes of my analysis, I
adopt a more minimalist definition: A smart contract is a piece of software
designed to execute future exchanges or other coordinated actions between
persons who might otherwise not trust one another to perform.22 The
definition is functional. It turns on the purpose for which the software was
written and is used, what it is meant to do. It does not assume, however,
that the creation or use of the software involves a promise, agreement or
legal contract.
Some authors have used “smart contract” more narrowly to refer
only to software fitting one of above definitions that is run on a distributed

smart contract must actually be a contract. That is to say, it must meet the
characteristics of being a legally enforceable exchange of promises.”).
But see Chamber of Digital Commerce, “Smart Contracts” Legal Primer:
Why Smart Contracts are Valid Under Existing Law and Do Not Require Additional
Authorization 1 (January 2018) (arguing that not all smart contracts are legal
contracts); Grimmelmann, supra note 7 at 4 (“[P]arties who [employ a smart
contract] at the same time may or may not enter into legal obligations . . . or they
may even enter into legal obligations without knowing it or intending to.”);
Jonathan Rohr, Smart Contracts in Traditional Contract Law, Or: The Law of the
Vending Machine, 67 Clev. St. L. Rev. 67, 68 (2019) (“Although they can be, smart
contracts are not necessarily legal contracts.”).
22
For similar definitions, see Chamber of Digital Commerce, “Smart Contracts,
supra note 21 at 1 (“A smart contract is computer code programmed to execute
transactions based on pre-defined conditions.”); Cohney & Hoffman, supra note 4
at 323 (“A transactional script is a persistent piece of software residing on a public
blockchain. When executed as a part of an exchange, the code effectuates a
consensus change to the state of a ledger.”); Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Smart Contracts,
Bitcoin Bots, and Consumer Protection, 71 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. Online 35, 38
(2014) (defining “smart contracts” as “automated programs that transfer digital
assets within the block-chain upon certain triggering conditions”); Rohr, supra note
21 at 68 (“I use the term ‘smart contract’ in a general sense to refer to a computer
protocol (code) that is stored on a blockchain (or distributed ledger) and which will
be automatically executed by the nodes on the blockchain’s network upon the
occurrence of specified conditions.”); Savelyev, supra note 18 at 127 (“[I]t is
possible to define a Smart contract as a piece of software code, implemented on a
Blockchain platform, which ensures self-performance and the autonomous nature
of its terms, triggered by conditions defined in advance and applied to Blockchaintitled assets.”); Kevin Werbach, Trust, but Verify: Why the Blockchain Needs the
Law, 33 Berk. Tech L.J. 487, 505 (2018) (“Smart contracts are essentially
autonomous software agents. With smart contracts, a distributed ledger becomes
functionally a distributed computer.”).
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ledger, or blockchain.23 Although blockchain technology did not exist when
Szabo introduced the term, its development has led to renewed interest in
smart contracts. The ability to install a smart contract on a distributed ledger
effects at least three important changes. First, the software no longer runs on
a single computer or server, but effectively on thousands of computers at
once with an incentive structure designed to ensure reliability. As a result,
the parties no longer need to trust a single software host. Second, running a
smart contract on a distributed ledger can make it difficult or impossible for
a party to alter or halt its operation. Third, blockchain technology enables
parties to employ smart contracts while remaining anonymous.
In my view, none of these features makes an important difference in
thinking about the relationship between smart contracts and legal contracts.
First, although taking a single software host out of the loop can reduce
some risks, including the likelihood of certain types of breach of associated
legal contracts, third-party platforms also can be secure and reliable. And as
Part Five discusses, running software on a distributed ledger does not rule
out other forms of technical malfunction and legal breach. Second,
although transactions on distributed ledgers are more difficult to halt or
unwind, contract remedies rarely aim to undo or prevent breach. More
commonly they seek to compensate the nonbreaching party for her losses—
a project that is the same whether the breach cannot be undone because it
happens on a distributed ledger or because we cannot change the past.24
Finally, although anonymity can provide a practical barrier to contract
enforcement, it is not a necessary feature of smart contracts run on
distributed ledgers.
Running a smart contract on a distributed ledger makes other
differences as well. Code on a distributed ledger is publicly accessible,
meaning that it is available for all users to see. And at present, transacting
on a distributed ledger requires a fair amount of expertise, meaning that
anyone using the software has some degree of technical sophistication. This
article argues that both the accessibility of the code and the sophistication
23

See, e.g., Cohney & Hoffman, supra note 4 at 323; Levi & Lipton, supra note 20;
Levy, supra note 9 at 1; Rodriguez, supra note 19 at 698-99; Rohr, supra note 21 at
68; Savelyev, supra note 18 at 127; Werbach, supra note 22 at 505. But see
Lingwall & Mogallapu, supra note 21 at 299 (suggesting that use of blockchain is
not essential to smart contracts, though blockchain has given them increasing
salience); Verstraete, supra note 20 at 757 (“[T]he bedrock principles of smart
contracts do not require a specific technology. . . . Recently, blockchain
technology has revived and implemented the idea of smart contracts. Yet, it is
important to keep in mind that the principles and ideas behind smart contracts do
not rise and fall solely on the promise of the blockchain.”).
24
Werbach and Cornell emphasize this backward-looking aspect of contract law, I
would argue to a fault. “Contract law is a remedial institution. Its aim is not to
ensure performance ex ante, but to adjudicate the grievances that may arise ex
post.” Werbach & Cornell, supra note 2 at 328. This article suggests that contract
law is a multi-function tool.
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of the parties are relevant to how the code does or should figure the terms
of a legal contracts. Neither feature, however, is unique to software run on
a distributed ledger. As such, they do not provide a compelling reason to
limit the inquiry to the narrower category. Lastly, Cohney and Hoffman
observe that running software on a distributed ledger can be enormously
expensive as compared to other platforms, significantly limiting when it is
cost effective to use those platforms.25 This is yet another reason not to limit
the inquiry to software on distributed ledgers.
1.2

Smart Contracts and Contractual Writings

Having described what a smart contract is, it is possible to say a few
words about similarities and differences between smart contracts and
contractual writings.
The similarities are notable. Both smart contracts and contractual
writings have a lexical structure: they are produced by assembling semantic
elements in accordance with syntactical rules to produce meaningful texts.
And because smart contracts are designed to do the work of legal
contracts—coordinating future behavior—they often share a logical
structure as well. Both often include, for example, conditionals of the form:
If x occurs, then do y.26 Thus if a contractual writing contains the sentence,
“If payment is not received by December 31, 2020, then Buyer will owe an
additional fee of $1,000,” an associated smart contract might include a
chunk of code reading something like (in JavaScript):
if (Date.now() > Date.parse("2020-12-31") &&
amtDue > 0) {
totalAmtDue = amtDue + 1000;
}
The smart contract’s code mirrors the structure of a contractual writing
designed to do the same job. Finally, both smart contracts and contractual
writings can be read. One who knows the relevant language can assign
meaning to each. As Jason Allen puts the point, a smart contract is “written
in a language that is both human-intelligible and machine-readable.”27
But there are also important differences.28 A contractual writing is,
in the first instance, a communicative act, designed to be read by humans
with the aim of discovering its communicative content: what its author or
25

Cohney & Hoffman, supra note 4 at 335-41.
See Raskin, supra note 20 at 312-13 (emphasizing the conditional structure of
both contracts and programming languages).
27
Allen, supra note 19 at 312.
28
For more on differences between smart contracts and contractual writings, see
Jeremy M. Sklaroff, Smart Contracts and the Cost of Inflexibility, 166 U. Pa. L. Rev.
263, 275-77 (2017).
26
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authors intended to convey to a reader.29 One can also “read” a smart
contract. But the goal when reading computer code is different. One reads
code not to determine the programmer’s communicative intent, but to
determine what it was designed to do and how it will in fact operate. And
of course code is written to be read first and foremost in a third, more
metaphorical sense: by the platform on which it runs. Code is designed to
operate as part of a digital machine. Whereas a contractual writing is a
communicative act, code is in the first instance a mechanism.
This is not to deny that code can be rich in meanings. Just as an
architect’s plans for a building might be innovative, elegant, pedestrian,
derivative, referential, ironic, or funny, a piece of operational code might,
to the expert eye, be any of those and more. And just as one might
recognize the craftsman’s hand in a piece of custom-built furniture, one
might see the in code the distinctive style of its author or authors. But code
is not primarily a means of communication. It is not, in the philosopher
Paul Grice’s formulation, intended to produce an effect in its audience by
the very recognition of that intent.30
This is the deeper reason why it is misguided to include in the
definition of “smart contract” that the software is a form of promise or
agreement.31 A promise is a speech act in which the speaker communicates
the intent to undertake an obligation. Because code is not, as such, a
communicative act, it cannot, as such, be a promise. An agreement is an
understanding between two or more persons about what each shall do, or a
speech act through which persons commit themselves to such an
understanding. A piece of software, standing alone, is not an agreement
either of these senses.
Although code is, in itself, neither a promise nor an agreement, it
can be the subject matter of a promise or agreement. A party can agree or
promise to use a piece of software, or that the operation of the software
shall satisfy one or both parties’ obligations. And in some instances, the act
of using software might express a party’s agreement to a transaction—just as
two persons’ attempts to row in unison might express a tacit agreement to
continue doing so,32 or a seller’s shipment of goods might express its
agreement to a buyer’s offer.33 But though the rowers express their
29

The locus classsicus for this account is Paul Grice, Meaning, 66 Phil. Rev. 377
(1957), reprinted in Paul Grice, Studies in the Way of Words 213 (1989).
30
Id. at 219.
31
For more on the nature of promises and agreements, see Gregory Klass, Promise,
Agreement, Contract, in Research Handbook on Private Law Theory 39 (H. Dagan
& B. Zipursky eds. 2020).
32
“Two men, who pull the oars of a boat, do it by agreement or convention, tho’
they have never given promises to each other.” David Hume, Of Morals, In A
Treatise on Human Nature 291, 315 (David Fate Norton & Mary J. Norton eds.,
Oxford Univ. Press 2000) (1739-1740).
33
See UCC 2-206.
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agreement using the oars and the seller by shipping the goods, neither the
oars nor the goods is itself the agreement, in the sense that a verbal
agreement is. Neither is an artifact with a communicative content. The
same goes for code to which parties agree, or whose use expresses their
agreement.
This is not to say that software cannot serve as interpretive evidence
of the parties’ agreement, or otherwise figure into the construction of their
contract. The design or operation of a smart contract that the parties have
agreed to, or that the parties have used reached an agreement, might figure
into the determination of their legal obligations. But—and this is the central
point of this section—one should not assume that it does, and one should
not be misled by smart contracts’ lexical structure into thinking that those
consequences can be read from the code in the way terms can sometimes
be read from a contractual writing.34 Perhaps in some circumstances that is
so. But we need an argument for why and when it is.
A final observation before diving into the substance. A reader might
object that in fact software often does contain communicative acts:
nonoperational comments that programmers have placed in the code.35 The
above line of code, for example, might be preceded by the comment:
/* automatically adds late fee
when calculating total due */
A comment like this is a communicative act in the Gricean sense. And it
will be important to consider the possible legal effects of such comments—
when if ever they should figure into the interpretive evidence of a legal
contract, and whether they might even function as contractual writings.
Comments do not, however, pose the conceptual challenges that
operational code does. Although it is worth thinking about how comments
in the code of a smart contract might figure into the content of an
associated legal contract, comments are the easier piece of the puzzle.

34

I consider it problematic, for example, that the UK Jurisdiction Taskforce’s report
on cryptoassets and smart contracts regularly speaks of the “terms” of a smart
contract. See, e.g., UK Jurisdiction Taskforce, Legal Statement on Cryptoassets and
Smart Contracts 31 (November 2019) (asking, “In what circumstances is a smart
contract capable of giving rise to binding legal obligations, enforceable in
accordance with its terms?”).
35
Cohney and Hoffman argue, for example, that “[c]ode—when read with its
natural language comments and commit logs—has communicative meaning that
courts should seek to ascertain and enforce.” Cohney & Hoffman, supra note 4
(emphasis added).
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2. The Standard Vending Machine and Black-Box Smart Contracts
In the years since Szabo’s foundational article, the comparison of
smart contracts to vending machines has become virtually de rigueur. The
reason is that vending machines and smart contracts serve, at a high degree
of generality, the same function: to enable transactions between individuals
who do not trust one another.
Vending machines are connected to legal contracts in two ways.
First, as Szabo emphasized, a vending machine is designed to do a job that
a legal contract might do: enable a mutually beneficial exchange between
parties who do not otherwise trust one another to perform.36 David Hume
long ago described the problem both seek to solve:
Your corn is ripe to-day; mine will be so tomorrow. It is profitable
for us both, that I should labour with you to-day, and that you
should aid me to-morrow. I have no kindness for you, and know
you have as little for me. I will not, therefore, take any pains upon
your account; and should I labour with you upon my own account,
in expectation of a return, I know I should be disappointed, and that
I should in vain depend upon your gratitude. Here then I leave you
to labour alone: You treat me in the same manner. The seasons
change; and both of us lose our harvests for want of mutual
confidence and security.37
Call this the “basic mistrust problem.” A legal contract can solve the basic
mistrust problem in two ways at once. First, the legal contract gives the
farmer who is to perform second a new reason to do so: the threat of a
lawsuit. Second, it insures the farmer who performs first against the other’s
defection: if the second breaches, the first will be able to recover
compensatory damages.

36

Thus Szabo has recently written, “At its core, a vending machine is a security
mechanism: the amount in the till should be less than the cost of breaching the
till.” Nick Szabo, Forward, Chamber of Digital Commerce, Smart Contracts: 12
Use Cases for Business and Beyond 3 (December 2016).
37
Hume, supra note 32 at ___. Hume uses the example to explain not contract law,
but the social practice of promising. Hobbes makes the same point with respect to
contract law:
[In a state of nature] he that performeth first, has no assurance the other will
perform after, because the bonds of words are too weak to bridle men's
ambition, avarice, anger, and other passions, without the fear of some coercive
power. . . . But in a civil estate, where there a power set up to constrain those
that would otherwise violate their faith . . . he which by the covenant is to
perform first is obliged to do so.
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, 84-85 [I.xiv.18-19] (Hackett 1994/1651).
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The basic mistrust problem is not ubiquitous. An unattended
roadside fruit stand with a box for depositing cash is a tool for exchanges
between strangers where there is a degree of trust. The owner leaves their
vegetables at the stand, trusting that passing drivers will pay for what they
take. (The trust need not be complete. The owner might put a lock on the
cash box and nail it to the table.) But such trust does not always exist. The
operator of a vending machine does not trust that if they leave the candy
bars unattended on a table, those who take the bars will pay for them. So
the operator uses a machine that releases the bars only after payment has
been made. The machine does the job—solving the basic mistrust
problem—that a legal contract might otherwise perform.
Second, and this is crucial to everything that follows, use of a
vending machine can at the same time create a legal contract between the
user and the machine’s operator. This is so even though the parties
exchange few if any words. And it is so even though the parties are not, in
the first instance, relying on contract law to solve the basic mistrust
problem. Moreover, the legal contracts that attach to these transactions are
not merely vestigial. This part argues that even if the machine solves the
basic mistrust problem, the resulting legal contract still adds value to the
transaction.
The first section of this Part examines in greater detail these two
relationships between traditional vending machines and legal contracts: a
vending machine substitutes for a legal contract and its use generates a
legal contract. The second draws out the implications for what I call “blackbox smart contracts.”
2.1

The Standard Vending Machine

Imagine a standard vending machine built in the middle of the
twentieth century. The machine is contained in a metal box about one and
a half meters high and a meter across. In the middle of the front is a glass
window, behind which is a row of candy bars, each with a price tag. Below
each bar is a pull handle. Below the pull handles is an opening where
candy is delivered. On the upper right corner of the box is a coin slot, a
lever labeled “Refund,” and a small opening where coins can be returned.
Other than the prices and the “Refund” label, the only word on the
machine is “CANDY,” printed in large letters. Inside the machine are
various analog mechanisms designed to perform the functions of a standard
vending machine. Call these the machine’s “guts.”
Suppose Acme Vending Company (“Acme”) installs such a standard
vending machine in in a law school faculty lounge, and that immediately
after teaching his Contracts course, Professor Charles Kingsfield, Jr. puts two
quarters into the machine, pulls a handle, and does not receive a candy
bar. Suppose also that when Professor Kingsfield depresses the lever labeled
“Refund,” he does not receive his coins back. Professor Kingsfield might
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successfully sue Acme for breach of contract. When two persons’ nonverbal
conduct evinces their agreement to an exchange, the result is an implied-infact contract. The machine’s appearance would lead a reasonable person to
believe that inserting coins in the right amount and pulling a handle will
result in the delivery of a candy bar.38 Acme’s act of installing the vending
machine is therefore an implied-in-fact offer to sell candy bars. When
Professor Kingsfield inserts his two quarters, he accepts that offer, after
which Acme has a legal duty to provide Professor Kingsfield a candy bar or
return his money.39 Acme’s failure to do either breaches that legal duty,
exposing it to a lawsuit by Professor Kingsfield.40
The example is, of course, fanciful. The costs of filing a law suit
would dwarf any amount Professor Kingsfield could recover. And the mere
threat of a lawsuit would cause Acme to simply return Professor Kingsfield
his money. One might replace in the example “candy bar” with “iPhone”
and make the lawsuit a class action. But the existence of a legal contract
does not depend on the amounts at stake.
What are the terms of the legal contract between Acme and
Professor Kingsfield? The terms of any implied-in-fact legal contract depend
in the first instance to the parties’ objectively reasonable understanding of
their agreement. In vending machine transactions, the interpretive evidence
38

See Barker v. Allied Supermarket, 596 P.2d 870, ___ (Okl. 1979) (“It has been
held that in a self-service store, the ‘merchant’s act of stocking the self-service
displays with goods thereby makes an offer to the shopper,’ which the shopper
accepts by taking the goods from the shelf.”).
39
The logic of offer and acceptance is malleable. One might instead view a
vending machine as a solicitation of offers, the act of dropping coins into the
machine as the making of an offer, and the machine’s failure to return the coins as
an acceptance of that offer. Nothing in the analysis below turns on the
characterizations. See Rohr, supra note 21 at 74-75 (offering a similar analysis of
offer and acceptance in vending machine transactions).
40
The caselaw on contracts generated by the use of a vending machine is thin. But
see Haynes v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Chicago, 250 N.E.2d 20 (Ill. App. Ct.
1976) (Coca Cola sold through a vending machine and containing fungus violated
implied warranty of merchantability); Alfonso v. Stavnitsky, 8 Conn. Supp. 34
(Com. Pl. 1940) (breach of implied warranty of fitness in sale from confectionary
vending machine). See also Moore v. Compass Grp. USA, Inc., 2019 WL 4723077
(E.D. Mo. Sept. 26, 2019) (describing but not ruling on plaintiffs’ claim that credit
card surcharges violated plaintiff’s contract with vending machine operator); Jaye v.
Crane Merch. Sys., Inc., 2020 WL 406942 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 24, 2020) (same); Oliver
v. Compass Grp. USA, Inc., Case No. 1:18-CV-05998 (filed in the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois on Aug. 31, 2018) (complaint with similar
claim).
Curiously, the Soviet Union codified this rule for vending machines.
Section two of Article 498 of the USSR Civil code provided, “The contract of retail
sale with the use of vending machines shall be deemed to be concluded since the
time of the commission by the buyer of the actions necessary for the receipt of
goods.” [Cite] This section remains a part of the Russian Civil Code.
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is fairly thin. There are no contractual writings. In fact, the only
communicative acts in the example are the labels, “CANDY” and “Refund,”
and the price tags. But there is little doubt as to what one has the right to
expect from a vending machine. Our shared cultural understanding of what
vending machines do determines the objectively reasonable understanding
of Acme and Professor Kingsfield’s agreement, which in turn generates
Acme’s legal duty to deliver a candy bar or provide a refund after the
insertion of coins.
Acme’s duty to deliver a candy bar or a refund is not all there is to
the legal contract. Because this is a sale of goods, the transaction is
governed by Article Two of the UCC. Suppose the machine delivers a
candy bar that is two-thirds the size of the one displayed. Professor
Kingsfield can then invoke UCC section 2-313: “Any sample or model
which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty
that the . . . goods shall conform to that sample or model.”41 Or suppose the
machine delivers a stale candy bar. Professor Kingsfield might now turn to
section 2-314, which provides that when a merchant sells goods, there is an
implied warranty of merchantability that the goods are of a quality that
would “pass without objection in the trade” and that they “are fit for the
ordinary purposes for which such goods are used.”42
These terms of the legal contract between Acme and Professor
Kingsfield are not immutable. Acme might, for example, put a sign on the
machine reading, “All candy sold as is.” Under the UCC, Acme has
contracted out of the implied warranty of merchantability, meaning that a
stale candy bar no longer counts as a breach.43 The express warranty
created by the sample candy bars, however, remains.44
A sign reading “Use at your own risk” would have different legal
consequences. A court would likely construe such as sign as shifting the
risk of mechanical failures to the customer. Now if neither a candy bar nor
a refund is provided due to a mechanical glitch, Professor Kingsfield does
not have an action for breach. But even with such a sign, Professor
Kingsfield can reasonably expect that he is using a machine designed to
provide candy bars in exchange for money. It is reasonable to understand
“risk” in this context as referring to mechanical glitches or other accidental
failures, not to the operator’s purposeful nondelivery of candy. The sign
does not negate Acme’s legal duty, for example, to regularly load the
vending machine with candy.
Like all offers, Acme’s implied-in-fact offer can be stated in the form
of a conditional: If a customer inserts enough money into the machine,
41

UCC § 2-313(1)(c).
UCC § 2-314(2)(a) & (c). See Chaffin v. Atlanta Coca Cola Bottling Co., 194
S.E.2d 513, 515 (Ga. Ct. App. 1972) (holding that implied warranty of
merchantability applied in a vending machine transaction).
43
UCC § 2-316(3)(c).
44
UCC § 2-316(1).
42
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Acme will provide a candy bar. And the guts of a standard vending
machine, in some sense, mirror that conditional structure. They are
designed so that if a person inserts money, the machine will provide a
candy bar. There is an isomorphism between the guts and the legal
contract.
That isomorphism does not, however, make the guts part of the
interpretive evidence—the collection of facts that a court would use to
interpret the parties’ contractual agreement. The reason should be obvious:
the interpretive evidence of an agreement includes only facts available to
both sides. Acme has at least constructive knowledge of the machine’s guts.
But Professor Kingsfield has no clue about what is inside the machine. The
design of the machine’s interior does not, therefore, figure into the
agreement between Acme and Professor Kingsfield.
A somewhat fanciful example will illustrate the point and take the
thought experiment a bit further. Suppose that rather than the guts of a
standard vending machine, Acme installs a mechanism designed to
occasionally cause non-delivery of a candy bar and no refund—what I will
call a “Random No-Candy Generator” or “RNCG.”45 Because Professor
Kingsfield has no reason to know that the machine contains an RNCG, its
presence does not figure into the his agreement with Acme. A failure to
deliver candy due to the installation of an RNCG would be a breach. This
would be so even if Acme added a “Use at your own risk” sign. “Risk” in
such a warning is commonly understood to refer to malfunctions, not to
design features contrary to the user’s reasonable expectations.
Professor Kingsfield’s action for breach is not the only legal
consequence of installing an RNCG. Its presence in the machine would
also allow Professor Kingsfield to argue that his assent to the transaction
was induced by a material misrepresentation, giving him the power to
rescind the legal contract. Even though the guts are not part of the
interpretive evidence, they might affect the legal contract between the
parties.
As it happens, rescinding the legal contract does not do Professor
Kingsfield much good. But the intentional installation of an RNCG also
exposes Acme to civil liability for the tort of deceit or for violation of the
local unfair and deceptive acts and practices statute, and perhaps even to
criminal liability. This additional layer of legal protection is important.
Professor Kingsfield is relying not on the law of contract to solve the
mistrust problem—in practice the amounts at stake are far too small for him
to sue—but on the proper operation of the vending machine. How can he
know that the machine’s guts, which he cannot see, are in fact designed to
45

The example is not entirely fanciful. Kerry Segrave finds evidence from the early
days of vending machines—around the turn of the last century—of “a growing
tendency on the part of some early vending inventors to combine an element of
chance with their merchandise machines.” Kerry Segrave, Vending Machines: An
American Social History 20 (2002).

19

How to Interpret a Vending Machine (DRAFT)
deliver candy bars for coins? In part because a different design would
expose Acme to fines, punitive damages even criminal prosecution. In a
standard vending machine transaction the law still plays a role in solving
the basic mistrust problem, though the relevant law is not traditionally
considered part of the law of contract.
If a “Use at your own risk” sign is not enough to avoid legal liability
for installation of an RNCG, is there something Acme could say to do so?
Perhaps. Suppose Acme replaces the word “CANDY” on the outside of the
box with the words “CANDY SLOT MACHINE,” and installs it in a casino
rather than a faculty lounge. Those actions would both put users on notice
that they should not rely on their common cultural understanding of
vending machines, and inform them of the machine’s atypical design.
The results of the thought experiment can be summarized as
follows. First, a standard vending machine does work that, in other
transactions, legal contracts do. It solves the basic mistrust problem.
Second, under existing law, use of a standard vending machine nonetheless
generates a legal contract between the user and operator. Third, the terms
of that legal contract depend on the cultural understanding of what vending
machines do, aspects of the vending machine apparent to the user, and
legal default and mandatory terms. Fourth, those terms do not depend on
the machine’s internal mechanism, which are not visible to the user—
though those mechanisms might give rise to one or more contract defenses
or separate causes of action. Fifth, the standard vending machine cannot do
the job of a legal contract—solving the basic mistrust problem—without the
help of the law. Laws that punish deceptive acts assure users that the
vending machine’s internal mechanisms are designed to operate in
accordance with users’ reasonable expectations. The machine is not a
complete substitute for the law. Finally, effectively opting-out of the
standard cultural meaning of a vending machine requires clear and
conspicuous notice to users.
2.2

Black-Box Smart Contracts

The takeaway for smart contracts is fairly straightforward. None of
the above results change if the guts of the vending machine include digital
elements. It makes no difference if the vending machine has a
microprocessor running code, or if Acme (weirdly) chooses to run that code
on a distributed ledger with which the machine interacts. Because such
code would not be evidence of the parties’ agreement, it would not belong
to the interpretive evidence and would not affect the terms of the legal
contract.
Call a smart contract whose code one or both users cannot access a
“black-box smart contract.” As technology develops, black-box smart
contracts are likely to become quite common. Suppose, as suggested in the
Introduction, a fruit wholesaler and a trucking company employ software
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that automatically adjusts the price for transporting avocados based on the
bumpiness of the ride, as measured by vibration sensors in the shipper’s
trucks. Perhaps the trucking company has developed the system in-house,
then offered it to all its customers. Or parties to a long-term shipping
contract might purchase the system from a third-party vendor. Under either
scenario, one or both parties might not be given access to the code.
Like the standard vending machine, use of the vibration sensing
software does some of the work a legal contract might. Rather than using
the software, the parties might have signed a contractual writing that
provided a payment schedule based on the condition of the fruit upon
arrival. The parties have automated a process that they might have
otherwise accomplished with human beings acting pursuant to a legal
contract.
Also like a standard vending machine, the parties’ agreement to use
the vibration sensing software nonetheless creates a legal contract. But
there is a difference. Because more money is at stake in this new example,
the legal contract is even more likely to remain part of the solution to the
basic mistrust problem. If the vibration sensing software fails to work as
expected—the fruit arrives in a condition that suggests a bumpy ride, but
the system does not discount the price—it would be financially viable to
sue for breach of the legal contract. And a party that does not have access
to the code will be especially concerned to have this legal protection. In the
economy of trust, a black-box smart contract does not so much substitute
for the legal contract as work in tandem with it. Finally, if the smart contract
is provided by one of the parties, the other might also rely on the law of
deception—the tort of deceit, UDAP statutes, criminal fraud—for protection
against code designed to work other than advertised.
What are the terms of the legal contract? Unlike a standard vending
machine transaction, the parties to the avocado shipping contract will have
discussed many aspects of the transaction, and have perhaps even
memorialized parts of it in a contractual writing. If the legal contract ends
up being adjudicated, those communications will figure into the
interpretive evidence. The smart contract code will not. Because one or
both parties do not have access to the code, it is irrelevant to interpreting
their agreement. That said, if the software was provided by one side, it
might be introduced as evidence of fraud or misrepresentation.
Can the supplier of a black-box smart contract stipulate, using
words outside the code, that aspects of the code shall govern? If the
trucking company supplies the vibration-sensing system, it might include
risk-shifting language to insulate itself from liability for operational bugs in
the code, in the way that “as is” or “Use at your own risk” sign on a
vending machine operates. Such language would not, however, insulate the
trucking company from liability for design elements contrary to a the
wholesaler’s reasonable understanding of how the system functions. This is
especially so if the trucking company makes express representations about
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what the software does. Nor would such risk-shifting language make the
code evidence of the parties’ agreement. Again, to the extent that the code
is not shared, it says nothing about the parties’ agreement and so does not
affect the terms of their legal contract.
3. The Mutually Constructed Vending Machine and Mutually
Programmed Smart Contracts
Placing a smart contract in a black box has both legal and practical
consequences. Legally, the fact that one or both sides does not have access
to the code means that the code cannot serve as evidence of their
agreement. As such, it does not belong to the interpretive evidence of any
legal contract between them. Practically, putting the smart contract in a
black box means that there remains a mistrust problem. Parties without
access to the code might not trust that the smart contract is designed to do
what it is supposed to do. The law can help solve that mistrust problem. If
there is a legal contract, a software malfunctions might qualify as a breach.
And software that is programed to do something other than promised can
expose a party providing it to civil or criminal liability—in tort, under state
UDAP statutes, or even the criminal law.
Another solution to mistrust of the code is to give both users access
to it. Call a smart contract whose non-compiled code is accessible to all
users a “glass-box smart contract.” There two broad categories of glass-box
smart contracts. The first, which is the subject of this Part, comprises
software users program together. Smart contracts of this type will probably
never be common. Bespoke programming is costly and requires
sophistication. But just as the idea of mutually negotiated contractual
writings drives many intuitions about the law of contracts, so the idea a
mutually programmed smart contract will help sharpen intuitions about
smart contracts.46 The second category of glass-box contracts, which is the
subject of the next part, comprises smart contracts programmed by one user
or a third party and provided to non-programming users together with
access to the code.
3.1

The Mutually Constructed Vending Machine

Suppose Orville and Wilbur are engineers who work at the same
company. Orville works the day shift, Wilber the night shift. In Orville’s
spare time, he runs a chocolate truffle business. In Wilbur’s spare time, he
runs a coffee shop. They meet for the first time at a company picnic, where
they learn of one another’s outside interests. Orville suggests that Wilbur
46

James Grimmelmann, for example, starts off his analysis of smart contract code
supposing that “[t]he contracting parties write a computer program that embodies
their agreement.” Grimmelmann, supra note 7 at 2.

22

How to Interpret a Vending Machine (DRAFT)
buy his chocolate truffles to sell in Wilbur’s coffee shop. Wilbur likes the
idea, and they agree on a wholesale price of $1 per chocolate truffle.
Because both are engineers, they decide to build a machine to effect the
exchanges, which they will install at their workplace. Orville will load
chocolate truffles into the machine during the day. When Wilbur is there
for the nightshift, he will insert cash into the machine, which will deliver
him the corresponding number of chocolate truffles. Orville will have the
only key to the machine, allowing him to load his chocolate truffles into it
and to remove the money Wilbur has deposited. The key will not, however,
give Orville access to the machine’s guts. The two engineers spend the
following four weekends in Orville’s garage building the machine, which
they then install with their supervisor’s permission in an unused closet. The
result is a mutually constructed vending machine.
As with the standard vending machine, the mutually constructed
vending machine is designed to effectuate mutually beneficial exchanges
between parties who do not otherwise trust one another to perform. Orville
and Wilbur might have accomplished the same thing using the law of
contract. Wilbur could, for example, simply submit a daily truffle order to
Orville, which Orville might accept either by using words or by delivering
chocolate truffles. Each acceptance by Orville would create a legal
contract, under which Wilbur would have a legal duty to pay for chocolate
truffles delivered.
Although Orville and Wilbur are relying on a mechanical device
rather than the law to solve the basic mistrust problem, use of the mutually
constructed vending machine again generates a legal contract. Wilbur’s act
of putting money into the machine creates for Orville a legal duty to
provide chocolate truffles, through the machine or otherwise, or to return
the money. Thus if Wilbur inserts $30 into the machine and receives only
twenty chocolate truffles, Orville has a legal duty to either provide Wilbur
ten additional chocolate truffles or to return him $10. If Orville does
neither, Wilbur might sue Orville for breach.
Many of the terms of the legal contract between Orville and Wilbur
will be similar to the terms of a standard vending machine legal contract. If,
for example, Orville provides Wilbur some sample chocolate truffles, the
law will deem Orville to have expressly warranted that the chocolate
truffles he delivers will conform to that sample. And because Wilbur runs a
chocolate truffle business, the sales are subject to the implied warranty of
merchantability. Loading stale chocolate truffles would be a breach.
But there are also differences. For example, the fact that both Orville
and Wilbur have participated in the construction of the vending machine
might affect a reasonable understanding of the allocation of certain risks.
Because only the owner-operator has access to a standard vending
machine’s guts, the owner-operator is presumed to bear the risk of glitches.
Because Orville and Wilbur participated equally in the design and
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construction of their vending machine, it is not so obvious who should bear
the risk of its malfunction.
In addition, there is considerably more interpretive evidence of
Orville and Wilbur’s agreement. In the basic transaction between Acme
and Professor Kingsfield, the content of their contract was largely
determined by the common cultural understanding of how vending
machines work. The parties barely communicated with one another. The
transaction between Orville and Wilbur, in distinction, began with a
conversation in which they agreed to basic terms—what sorts of goods
Orville would supply and how much Wilbur would pay for them. In this
respect Orville and Wilbur’s agreement looks more like that between the
trucking company and avocado wholesaler. It is verbose.
Finally, the design of Orville and Wilbur’s mutually constructed
vending machine belongs to the interpretive evidence of their agreement.
Orville and Wilbur’s joint participation in the machine’s construction
means that its design reflects their agreement. Suppose Orville and Wilbur
never record that agreement in writing, that Wilbur inserts $30 and receives
only twenty chocolate truffles, that Orville neither provides the additional
ten chocolate truffles to Wilbur nor returns $10 to him, and that Wilbur
sues for breach. If Orville maintains that they had in fact agreed to a price
of $1.50 per chocolate truffle, Wilbur might point to the fact that the guts
are designed to deliver one chocolate truffle for each $1 inserted. That
design would be strong evidence that they agreed to the $1 price.
Alternatively, if Orville can show that nondelivery of the ten chocolate
truffles was due to the proper operation of a Random No-Candy Generator
that they together installed, he might argue that in fact he and Wilbur had
agreed to exchange not money for chocolate truffles, but money for a
chance at chocolate truffles.
Here a court would need to distinguish between the mutually
constructed vending machine’s design and its operation. Suppose
examination of the guts reveals that nondelivery of chocolate truffles was
due to a faulty bill scanner, which occasionally reads a $20 bill as a $10
bill. This would appear to be a glitch in the machine—a bug not a feature,
part of the machine’s operation not its design. Because glitches are
unintended, they do not serve as evidence of the parties’ agreement. The
installation of an RNCG, in distinction, would belong to the machine’s
design. Its operation would be a feature, though it might produce results
identical to the those of a faulty scanner. Because an RNCG would be part
of the mutually constructed vending machine’s design, it would belong to
the interpretive evidence.
The example illustrates a broader point that will run through the
remainder of this article. One can ask two distinct questions about any
device. What is it designed to do? And: How does it in fact operate? The
first, design question concerns the device’s purpose or function. The
second, operation question is about how the device will actually perform,
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what it will do when put into use. The answers are connected. To
determine what an unfamiliar device is designed to do, one looks at how it
is likely to operate and asks, “Why would anyone build a machine that
does such-and-such?” Contrariwise, knowing that a device is designed for a
certain purpose can help one predict how it is likely to operate. But the
questions are distinct. Machines do not always operate as designed. What
matters when seeking to determine Orville and Wilbur agreement, and
thereby the terms of their legal contract, is the mutually constructed
machine’s design—how they intended it to function, in distinction from
how it actually operates.
3.2

Mutually Programmed Smart Contracts

The results remain largely the same if we change the thought
experiment to involve a mutually programmed smart contract. A somewhat
fanciful example will provide materials to consider additional ways smart
contracts can interact with legal contracts.47
Suppose Orville and Wilbur decide to build a fully automated
system for effectuating the exchanges of money for chocolate truffles.
Together they write a piece of software to do three things. First, using the
feed from a digital camera, the software constantly monitors the truffle
supply in Wilbur’s coffee shop. Second, when the software recognizes that
the supply is running low, it instructs an autonomous drone to pick up two
boxes of chocolate truffles from Orville’s store and deliver them to Wilbur’s
shop. Third, upon receiving confirmation of delivery from the drone, the
software effects a transfer of funds from Wilbur’s bank account to Orville’s,
at a rate of $1 per truffle delivered. Because Orville and Wilbur do not trust
third party platforms, they choose to run the software on a distributed
ledger.
If Orville and Wilbur were lawyers rather than engineers, they might
instead have drafted and signed a contractual writing. In that writing,
Orville would agree to supply and Wilbur would agree to accept all the
47

This section assumes that the parties themselves program the smart contract. One
might introduce yet another layer of complexity by assuming that one or both
parties employ someone else to do the programming. Thus Alexander Savelyev
observes:
Due to a separation between the person programming the code and the
person intending to use it in its commercial activities, there is a risk of
misunderstanding between them with regard to the terms of the future
agreement. Ultimately, differences may exist between implementation and
intent, and this danger may be aggravated by the huge gap of abstraction
between legal language and a programming language.
Savelyev, supra note 18 at 126. The issue also exists with respect to the
interpretation of contractual writings and other texts. See Gregory Klass, Boilerplate
and Party Intent, 82 Law & Contemp. Probs. 105, 123-24 (2019) (distinguishing
between author and authorizer meaning).
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chocolate truffles Wilbur requires, for which Wilbur would agree to pay $1
per truffle. Had they taken this path, Wilbur would need only inform
Orville that he was running low on chocolate truffles to trigger Orville’s
legal duty to supply more, after which Wilbur would have a legal duty to
pay for the chocolate truffles delivered. Orville and Wilbur’s automated
delivery and payment system, which includes the mutually programmed
smart contract, is designed to do a job that might instead be done by such a
legal contract.
At this point in the analysis it should come as no surprise that,
although the automated delivery and payment system is designed to
substitute for a legal contract, its construction and use nonetheless generate
one. The system implements and evinces Orville and Wilbur’s agreement
that Orville shall keep Wilbur’s coffee shop supplied with chocolate truffles
in exchange for Wilbur’s payment of $1 per truffle. If Orville stops making
chocolate truffles for a week, thereby preventing the system from restocking
Wilbur’s store, Wilbur can sue Orville for breach. If Wilbur lets his bank
account run low so the system cannot transfer payment into Orville’s
account, Orville can sue Wilbur for breach.
We might begin with four relatively straightforward observations
about this legal contract between Orville and Wilbur. First, for the same
reasons that the guts of the mutually constructed vending machine might be
used as evidence of Orville and Wilbur’s first agreement, the code of their
mutually programmed smart contract might figure into the interpretation of
the legal contract between them. Suppose, for example, the code includes
the following:
if (quantNow < 4) {
resupply(2)
}
where the value of “quantNow“ is provided by software connected to the
camera counting the boxes truffles and “resupply(x)” is the subroutine
that cause the drone to pick up x boxes of chocolate truffles from Orville’s
business and deliver them to Wilbur’s. The presence of that line, together
with the fact that Orville had a hand in writing it, would be evidence that
Orville had agreed to keep Wilbur’s shop supplied with chocolate truffles.
When both parties program a smart contract, the code is evidence of their
agreement, and belongs to the interpretive evidence of their contract.
Second, when using the code as interpretive evidence, a court
should focus on the code’s design, not its operation. The UK Jurisdiction
Taskforce white paper on bitcoin and smart contracts provides that “an
investigation of what the code actually does (possibly with the assistance of
expert evidence) may be needed as part of the exercise of interpretation.”48
48

UK Jurisdiction Taskforce, supra note 34 at 35.
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This formulation is misguided. What matters for the purposes of contract
interpretation is not a mutually programmed smart contract’s operation—
"what the code actually does”—but its design—what it is intended to do.
Suppose over the course of a month the system delivers 2,000 truffles to
Wilbur, but that due to a bug it does not transfer $2,000 from Wilbur’s bank
account to Orville’s. If Wilbur refuses to pay Orville the $2,000, Orville
might successfully sue Wilbur for breach. Their agreement, as embodied in
software’s design if not its operation, was that Wilbur would pay for truffles
received.
Third, interpreting what a smart contract is designed to do is
different in kind from interpreting a contractual writing. Had Orville and
Wilbur used a contractual writing to effect their exchange, it might have
included a sentence like, “Orville agrees to supply Wilbur all the chocolate
truffles that his business requires.” That sentence is an express undertaking.
Although the above fragment of code is designed to perform such an
undertaking, it is not itself the undertaking. It is evidence of the agreement,
not an expression of it. Reading code for what it is designed to do is not the
same as reading a contractual writing for its communicative content.
The code of a mutually programmed smart contract is best
understood by analogy to course of performance evidence.49 Code designed
by both parties is part of the performance of their agreement. It is not the
agreement itself. Nor does it communicate the agreement. It is, as Corbin
writes, “a further expression by the parties of the meaning that they give
and have given to the terms of their contract previously made.”50
Fourth, Orville and Wilbur’s choice to use a smart contract might
make the design question somewhat easier to answer than it was for the
mutually constructed mechanical vending machine. Coding languages
allow programmers to add nonoperational comments, which are commonly
used to explain how sections of the code are designed to operate and can
therefore help in the project of differentiating between the code’s design
and its operation—between features and bugs. The above fragment of code,
for example, might be preceded by the following comment:
//
//
//
//

resupply subroutine
No.boxes is number of boxes to be delivered;
resupply(No.boxes) causes drone to pick up
No.boxes from Orville and deliver to Wilbur

If a line in the subroutine causes the chocolate truffles to occasionally be
delivered to somewhere other than Wilbur’s place of business, the above
49

See, e.g., Brooklyn Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Dutcher, 95 U.S. 269, 273, 24 L.
Ed. 410 (1877) (“There is no surer way to find out what parties meant, than to see
what they have done.”); U.C.C. 1-303(a) (defining a course of performance).
50
3 Arthur Linton Corbin, Corbin on Contracts: A Comprehensive Treatise on the
Rules of Contract Law § 558, 249 (1951).
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comment would be strong evidence that this operational aspect of the code
is not part of the smart contract’s design.
All of the above is of a piece with the analysis of Orville and
Wilbur’s mutually constructed vending machine. Their code-based
automated delivery and payment system, however, introduces two new
wrinkles.
The first comes from the availability of code comments. Unlike
operational code, comments are communicative acts. They are intended to
share information with the reader, as distinguished from effecting changes
to a machine’s state. The above hypothetical comment concerns a
subroutine’s design: how it is meant to function. But programmers can say
anything they want in a comment—attributions, asides, jokes, complaints,
or recipes for vegan chili. One can imagine Orville and Wilbur, or the
creators of any mutually programmed smart contract, embedding not only
comments about how the code is designed to operate, but also comments
that express their agreement. Orville and Wilbur might, for example, have
inserted a comment at the beginning of the code reading:
//
//
//

Parties hereby agree Orville shall supply
all of the chocolate truffles Wilbur needs,
for which Wilbur will pay $1 per truffle

Such a comment would qualify as a contractual writing, for it seeks to
memorialize details of Orville and Wilbur’s agreement. And one can
imagine other code comments that directly express the parties’ agreement
on more particular matters—Orville’s obligation to keep a supply of
chocolate truffles for the drones to pick up, Wilbur’s duty to keep funds in
his bank account, which party bears the risk of one or another malfunction
in the system, and so forth.
We might call comments that do not concern the design of the
code, but are intended to record aspects of the parties’ agreement
“contractual comments.” Courts should treat contractual comments in a
mutually drafted smart contract just like other writings that express the
parties’ agreement. In fact, one can imagine parties embedding the entirety
of a standard contractual writing as comments in the code of a mutually
programmed smart contract, perhaps to record it for all eternity in a
distributed ledger. But we should not confuse the way such contractual
comments would figure into the parties’ legal obligations with the way the
code’s design might. Saying something within the code is different from
designing code to do something.
The second wrinkle derives from the structure of Orville and
Wilbur’s exchange, and illustrates yet another way that contract law can
serve the interests of smart contract users.
Suppose after Orville and Wilbur set up the system, Chef’s Table—a
streaming documentary series that profiles professional chefs—devotes an
episode to Orville and his carefully crafted chocolate truffles (slow-motion
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Steadicam shots of Orville dusting the chocolate truffles with cocoa
powder). After the episode is released, demand for Orville’s truffles goes
through the roof, and with it their price. Wilbur, hoping to cash in on
Orville’s luck, begins selling Orville’s chocolate truffles not only at his
coffee shop, but to retail stores. In order to secure the quantity he needs, as
soon as the drone makes a delivery, Wilbur moves the boxes into his
delivery truck, out of the camera’s view, thereby causing the system to
immediately make another delivery.
The legal contract between Orville and Wilbur is a requirements
contract. Orville and Wilbur have agreed that Orville shall supply all the
chocolate truffles Wilbur requires. As such, section 2-306 of the UCC
governs:
A term which measures the quantity by the . . . the requirements of
the buyer means such actual . . . requirements as may occur in good
faith, except that no quantity unreasonably disproportionate to any
stated estimate or in the absence of a stated estimate to any normal
or otherwise comparable prior output or requirements may be
tendered or demanded.51
Suppose Orville and Wilbur’s smart contract software does not cap the rate
at which the system ships chocolate truffles to Wilbur’s coffee shop.
Examining the code would provide evidence that Orville and Wilbur
entered into a requirements contract. The system is designed to ensure that
Orville provides all the chocolate truffles Wilbur requires. The code would
not, however, reveal the limit UCC 2-306 puts on Orville’s legal duty to
provide chocolate truffles.
Orville and Wilbur might have built such a limit into their smart
contract. They might, for example, have programmed the system to track
and cap the rate of deliveries. Does their failure to do so constitute a bug in
the software? Not necessarily. Suppose Orville and Wilbur discussed
whether to cap the rate of deliveries, and even included in the software a
variable, “rate.Deliv”, to track it. But because Orville’s production
capacities were elastic, they decided not to limit the delivery rate and, just
to be clear, included the comment:
// no cap on rate.Deliv
The lack of a cap on the delivery rate is part of the system’s design. The
problem is that neither party anticipated the change in value of Orville’s
chocolate truffles. The bug is not in the software, which accurately reflects
the parties’ agreement, but in the agreement itself. Orville and Wilbur failed
to anticipate that Wilbur might use the system to take advantage at Orville’s
expense of an unexpected rise in price.
51

UCC 2-306(1).

29

How to Interpret a Vending Machine (DRAFT)
Smart contracts can address a basic mistrust problem: the worry that
the other side will not perform their side of the exchange. Part Two
emphasized a second mistrust problem that smart contracts do not solve,
but which the law can: worries about deception. But even if both those
mistrust problems are solved, there might remain a third: the worry that the
other side will exploit advantages that the contract gives her in ways the
parties did not anticipate. In the example, the problem is not that Wilbur
fails to perform his side of the bargain. He is paying for every chocolate
truffle he receives. The problem is that Wilbur is using their agreement in a
way the parties did not anticipate and at Orville’s expense: to become a
wholesaler of Orville’s chocolate truffles. Section 2-306 the general duty of
good faith are designed to protect against opportunism of this type.52
There are familiar reasons to think that these are the legal rules
parties want when they enter into exchange agreements. Just as Hume’s
farmers will not help one another unless they can solve the basic mistrust
problem (“The seasons change; and both of us lose our harvests for want of
mutual confidence and security”), so worries about opportunism might
prevent some mutually beneficial exchanges from happening. And even
when parties consider the risk of opportunism to be low, they are likely to
prefer legal protection against unbargained-for advantage taking. Rather
than expending the resources necessary to identify and address in a
contractual agreement—or in their smart contract—every contingency or
possible form of opportunism, parties are happy to rely on legal defaults
and the generally applicable duty of good faith that the law provides.
In short, the fact that a smart contract can be used to solve the basic
mistrust problem does not make it a complete substitute for a legal contract.
Contract law does more than ensure performance and insure against
breach. It is designed, among other things, to provide for unanticipated
contingencies and prevent opportunism.
The results of this Part can be summarized as follows. First, a
mutually programmed smart contract can do better at solving the basic
mistrust problem than can a black-box smart contract. Whereas users
without access to a black-box smart contract need a reason to trust that the
software will do what they expect, all users of a mutually programmed
smart contract know the code. Second, unlike the contents of a black-box
smart contract, the code behind a mutually programmed smart contract
might figure into the interpretation of the parties’ agreement. It belongs to
the interpretive evidence of that agreement. Third, when interpreting code
as evidence of the parties’ agreement, the proper question is what the code
is designed to do, not how it in fact operates. One must distinguish features
52

See UCC § 1-304 (duty of good faith); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205
(1981) (same). For a recent account of the duty of good faith along these lines, with
citations to the literature, see Daniel Markovits, Good Faith as Contracts Core
Value, in Philosophical Foundations of Contract Law 272 (Gregory Klass, et al. eds.,
2014).

30

How to Interpret a Vending Machine (DRAFT)
from bugs. Fourth, although both mutually negotiated smart contracts and
contractual writings can serve as interpretive evidence, they do so in very
different ways. In a mutually programed smart contract, operational code is
akin to course of performance evidence. It does not state the parties
agreement, but shows it. Fifth, code can, however, contain in comments
statements of agreement. When both parties had a hand in programming a
smart contract, such comments should be treated like any other
communications that express or evince some or all of the parties’
agreement. Sixth, even if a smart contract fully solves the basic mistrust
problem—even if the software locks in both sides’ performance—the parties
might still benefit from the law of contract. Just as a contractual writing
might fail to anticipate or provide for every contingency, so might a smart
contract. In addition to solving the basic mistrust problem and addressing
deception, the law serves to fill gaps in the parties’ agreement and to
prevent opportunism. It can play the same role with respect to smart
contracts.
4. The Glass-box Vending Machine and Glass-Box Smart Contracts of
Adhesion
The idea of a mutually programed smart contract is useful for
thinking through how smart contracts can figure into legal contracts. But
like bespoke contractual writings, mutually programmed smart contracts are
expensive to produce. One might for that reason expect them to be
relatively uncommon.
The more common type of glass-box smart contract will be software
whose code is made available to non-programming users. Glass-box
contracts of this type might be created by one user and then given to the
other together with access to the code. Or users might obtain the software
from a third-party vendor that gives both access to the code. For simplicity’s
sake, I focus on the first category.
The analog in contractual writings is the contract of adhesion, a
contractual writing drafted by one party and given to the other, or more
commonly to many others, on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. I will call a smart
contract produced by one party and provided the other without an
opportunity modification but with access to the code a “smart contract of
adhesion” or “adhesive smart contract.” Like adhesive contractual writings,
adhesive smart contracts raise distinctive issues of interpretation and
enforcement.
4.1

The Glass-Box Vending Machine

Again I begin with a mechanical example. Suppose Acme takes one
of its standard vending machines and replaces the metal exterior with a
glass box, giving users a view of the interior. Acme installs this glass-box
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vending machine in the faculty lounge of a mechanical engineering
department, arranged to provide an unobstructed view of its guts. Like a
standard vending machine, use of this glass-box vending machine produces
a legal contract. Does the glass box and machine’s location make a
difference in the terms of that legal contract?
Not necessarily. Suppose that after teaching Mechanics and
Materials I, Professor Emmett Brown goes to the faculty lounge and
encounters the newly installed glass-box vending machine. Professor Brown
is intrigued. But having just delivered a two-hour lecture on multiaxial
stress-strain relationships, all he wants is a candy bar. Without examining
the machine’s guts, Professor Brown puts two quarters into the slot and
pulls a handle. Unfortunately, the machine does not deliver a candy bar.
Nor when Professor Brown depresses the “Refund” lever does he get his
quarters back.
In order to think about how the machine’s guts might figure into the
content of the legal contract, suppose that nondelivery of the candy bar was
caused by a Random No-Candy Generator installed in the machine, which
Professor Brown would have recognized had he examined its interior. In
other words, had Professor Brown scrutinized the machine’s guts, he would
have known that Acme was offering not an exchange of money for candy
bars, but of money for a chance at receiving a candy bar. Should this make
a difference in whether Professor Brown can sue Acme for breach? That is,
does the visible presence of a RNCG affect the terms of the legal contract
between Acme and Professor Brown?
We are deep in the realm of the hypothetical, but there is a good
argument that so far the answer should be “No.” Consider the judicial
treatment of browsewrap, contractual writings on a website available via
hyperlink from other pages on the same site. A browsewrap page typically
opens with a pronouncement that by accessing pages that link to it, the user
agrees to the terms described therein. The writing then lists terms—damage
limitations, warranty provisions, data usage policies, choice of law clauses,
arbitration clauses, and the like—in language that suggest that they are
terms of a legal contract between the user and the site operator.
Browsewrap is a relatively new form of contractual writing. But
there is an emerging judicial consensus that browsewrap can generate a
legal contract with the user only if other pages on the website provide
sufficient notice of it. 53 Thus the Ninth Circuit has held:
[T]he onus must be on website owners to put users on notice of the
terms to which they wish to bind consumers. Given the breadth of
the range of technological savvy of online purchasers, consumers
53

See, e.g., Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1179 (9th Cir. 2014);
Herman v. Seaworld Parks & Entm’t, Inc., No. 8:14-CV-3028-T-35JSS, 2016 WL
7447555, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 26, 2016); Hines v. Overstock.com, Inc., 668 F.
Supp. 2d 362, 367 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
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cannot be expected to ferret out hyperlinks to terms and conditions
to which they have no reason to suspect they will be bound.54
At a minimum the user must be clearly informed that by accessing the site
they will be bound to the browsewrap terms. A mere link is not enough.
Acme’s glass-box vending machine does not employ browsewrap.
The machine’s guts are not a contractual writing. But the reasoning behind
the above rule might be extended to the example. It is true that Professor
Brown has the ability to “read” the guts of the glass-box machine. He could
figure out what the machine is designed to do. In the circumstances,
however, he has no reason to expect that the machine’s guts are anything
other than those of a standard vending machine, and so has no reason to
examine them. It is perfectly reasonable for Professor Brown to expect to
receive a candy bar in exchange for his payment. The glass-box vending
machine’s guts should be treated as evidence of the parties’ agreement only
if the user has sufficient notice that they might differ from those of a
standard vending machine. Absent such notice, the legal contract and its
terms are largely the same as those of a standard vending machine.
What would constitute sufficient notice in the case of the glass-box
vending machine? Just as reasonable minds can differ as to what counts as
sufficient notice of browsewrap terms,55 they can differ in the case of a
glass-box vending machine installed in an engineering department. But
surely it would be enough if Acme replaced the single word “CANDY” on
the front of the machine with “NONSTANDARD VENDING MACHINE.”
Now when Professor Brown encounters the glass-box vending machine, he
should know not to assume it is designed to deliver candy bars for money.
And because the machine is encased in glass and placed in an engineering
department faculty lounge, he should infer that if he wants to understand
what he will receive for his quarters, he should examine its guts. In these
circumstances, the proper functioning of an RNCG in the machine would
not constitute breach. So long as the mechanism is visible and easily
recognizable, someone with Professor Brown’s knowledge can be expected
to understand that by inserting coins into the machine he is purchasing not
a candy bar, but a chance at a candy bar.
Many of the points from Part Three apply pari passu to use of the
glass-box vending machine’s guts as interpretive evidence of the legal
contract between Acme and Professor Brown. For example, the machine’s
54

Nguyen, 763 F.3d at 1179.
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design would be more salient than its operation. Whereas Acme would be
off the hook for the proper operation of a clearly visible RNCG, Acme
would still be liable for glitches in the machine—unless it adds a “Use at
your own risk” sign. Nor do the machine’s guts fully determine the terms of
the legal contract. As with the standard vending machine, implied
warranties and other default terms apply, as do mandatory terms such as
the duty of good faith.
What if someone without Professor Brown’s expertise uses the
machine? Here the application of existing doctrine is less certain. Consider
the so-called duty to read: One who agrees to a contractual writing they
have not written and have chosen not to read is nonetheless bound by the
terms in it.56 Historically the rule applied even if a party was unable to read
the contractual writing. “He should read it if able; or, if illiterate, have it
read to him.”57 One can imagine a court taking the same attitude toward a
clearly labelled glass-box nonstandard vending machine. The words
“NONSTANDARD VENDING MACHINE” on a device installed in an
engineering department are enough to put even the non-expert on notice
that it might not be designed to provide candy bars for coins, and that they
want to know what they will get for their money, they should seek an
engineer’s advice.
That said, the duty to read does not entail that any term in a
contract of adhesion becomes part of the legal contract. Everyone knows
that contractual writings often go unread, generating the worry that drafters
might include unfair, unjust or otherwise socially unacceptable terms.
Scholars and courts have suggested various answers to that worry
with respect to adhesive contractual writings. Karl Llewellyn argued that
even in transactions between businesspeople, courts should distinguish
terms to which the parties actually agreed from those in a preprinted form.
“[W]here bargain is absent in fact, the conditions and clauses to be read
into a bargain are not those which happen to be printed on the unread
paper, but are those which a sane man might reasonably expect to find on
that paper.”58 This approach has been applied to insurance contracts. Thus
the reasonable expectations rule holds that a court should honor the
insured’s “objectively reasonable expectations . . . regarding the terms of
insurance contract . . . even though painstaking study of the policy
56
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provisions would have negated those expectations.”59 Alternatively, a court
might look to the terms’ substance. California courts have held that use of
an adhesive contractual writing can satisfy the procedural prong of the
unconscionability doctrine, opening the door for courts to examine the
terms’ substantive fairness.60 The draft Restatement of the Law Consumer
Contracts advocates this rule for standard terms in all consumer contracts of
adhesion.61
One can imagine a court taking either of these approaches to a nonexpert’s use of Acme’s glass-box vending machine. Under the first, the
question would be whether it is within the non-expert’s reasonable
expectations that the machine is offering not candy bars, but the chance at
receiving a candy bar. Under the second, the question would concern the
substantive fairness of the transaction—for example, whether the prices
Acme was charging reflected the chance that a user might not receive a
candy bar.
But there is a third option. A court might conclude that a glass box
vending machine offered to unsophisticated users is not like a contract of
adhesion, and that despite the glass box, its guts should not be included in
the interpretive evidence of the parties contractual agreement. Although the
words “NONSTANDARD VENDING MACHINE” put the user on notice
that something about the machine is different, a user who is not a
mechanical engineer does not have the capacity to figure out what that
difference is. The proper analogy here is not an adhesive consumer contract
written in legal English, but one written in Old Aramaic. Such a contractual
writing seeks to impose unreasonably high reading costs both on consumers
and on a third-party adjudicator later asked to enforce it. Rather than
assigning the consumer a duty to read—“He should read it if able; or, if
illiterate, have it read to him”—courts should simply refuse to give legal
effect to a consumer contract of adhesion written in a dead language. By
the same token, a court called upon to interpret a contract between Acme
and an unsophisticated user of its glass-box vending machine might simply
refuse to treat the machine’s guts as evidence of their agreement.
The analysis is admittedly speculative. If, improbably, glass-box
nonstandard vending machines became common, the law would need to
arrive at a rule to resolve when, if ever, their guts figure into the content of
legal contracts generated by their use. In doing so, lawmakers would need
to balance inter alia society’s interest in allowing parties to use whatever
59

Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83
Harv. L. Rev. 961, 967 (1970). A variation on this rule can be found in the
relatively uninfluential § 211(3) of the Restatement (Second) of Contract Law. See
Klass, supra note 47 at 131-33.
60
See, e.g., Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., 298 F.3d 778, 783-84 (9th
Cir. 2002).
61
Restatement of the Law Consumer Contracts § 5 cmt. 6(c) (Am. Law Inst.,
Tentative Draft April 18, 2019).
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means they wish to arrive at contractual agreements—words, actions or
even the design of a machine—against its interest in ensuring that people
know what they are getting when they enter into a legal contract.
4.2

Glass-Box Smart Contracts of Adhesion

Again many of the conclusions from the vending-machine thought
experiment apply also to smart contracts, though there are important
differences between the two cases and additional legal questions that merit
consideration. With respect to the legal questions, this is a natural point to
consider how much control the law does or should give parties over
whether the code of a smart contract figures into the terms of their legal
contract, and if so how.
Suppose Acme decides to diversify its operations by getting into the
cryptocurrency futures market. Rather than using an existing platform,
Acme creates a website on which it offers to the public futures in various
cryptocurrencies (Bitcoin, Ripple, Litecoin, Ether). In order to effectuate the
transactions, Acme writes a smart contract that is stored on a distributed
ledger, with the ledger effectively acting as the exchange. Acme’s website
explains that to execute a transaction, a user must first provide the smart
contract access to the user’s cryptocurrency wallets. The website then
instructs users how to access the distributed ledger and accept one of
Acme’s offers. Once a user accepts an offer, the software records the
transaction, waits until the date of trade, then executes the agreed-upon
exchange. Thus if a user on the first of January accepts Acme’s offer to sell
one Bitcoin for fifty-two Ether on the first of July, on July 1 the software will
automatically execute a transfer of one Bitcoin from Acme’s wallet to the
user’s, and a transfer of fifty-two Ether from the user’s wallet to Acme’s.
Suppose finally that Acme’s website contains a clearly labeled link to the
code on the distributed ledger. That is, the site employs a glass-box smart
contract of adhesion.
As in the earlier examples, use of Acme’s smart contract solves the
basic mistrust problem, doing some of the work of a legal contract. In this
instance, the smart contract solves the problem by giving users access to
code run on a tamper-proof distributed ledger. Also like the earlier
examples, use of the smart contract nonetheless generates a legal contract.
By using the smart contract, a user expresses their agreement to the offered
exchange.
Although Acme gives users access to the code, we should not be
too quick to assume that a court would or should treat the code as
interpretive evidence of the legal contract between Acme and its users. The
situation is comparable to the glass-box vending machine. Until the glassbox vending machine was relabeled as “NONSTANDARD,” Professor
Brown has no reason to suppose that its guts were anything other than those
of a typical vending machine, and so no reason to examine them. Similarly,
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users of Acme’s website, regardless of their sophistication, have no reason
to expect that Acme’s smart contract is designed to do anything other than
what they reasonably believe based on Acme’s website. In fact, users have
even less reason to examine the code than did Professor Brown. Whereas
the glass-box vending machine contained few if any words, Acme’s website
is verbose. It includes a natural-language description of the proposed
transactions. Users have access to the code, but they have no reason to
examine its design or operation, or to read any comments contained in it.
Consequently, the code should not affect the terms of the legal contracts
formed using it.
The thought experiment suggests two general points. First, although
some have suggested the possibility of “code-only” smart contracts,62 it is
difficult to imagine multiple parties interacting through a piece of software
without some natural-language communications concerning its function
and purpose.63 That is, smart contracts will almost always come “wrapped”
in natural language communications describing the nature of the
transaction, which will serve as interpretive evidence of the parties’
agreement.
Second, where there are such communications, an adhesive smart
contract’s code should not, absent special reason, figure into the
interpretive evidence, even if it is made available to the user. This
distinguishes adhesive smart contracts from mutually programmed smart
contracts. Whereas the code of a mutually programmed smart contract
always evinces the parties’ agreement, the default for adhesive smart
contracts should be that the code does not belong to the interpretive
evidence.
What words should suffice to bring the code into the interpretive
evidence? Suppose Acme adds the following text to the page on which
users enroll for trades:
By trading on this website you agree to abide by all transactions
executed by our smart contract. You can find the smart contract
here. Please examine the code closely to ensure that you
understand its design.64
62

See, e.g., Levi & Lipton, supra note 20 at 2 (distinguishing between “code-only
smart contracts” and “ancillary smart contracts”); UK Jurisdiction Taskforce, supra
note 34 at 35 (considering “a smart contract consisting solely of code with no
natural language element”). The UK Jurisdiction Taskforce, for example, imagines a
scenario in which “Alice deploys some code to a distributed ledger platform,” and
“Bob, who is not known to Alice, stumbles across the code and transacts with it.”
Id. at 34.
63
See Cohney & Hoffman, supra note 4 at 363 (“Any scripts that have practical
relevance will have some non-code language surrounding them.”).
64
A sophisticated drafter of such a clause might replace “design” in the above
clause with “design and operation.” The additional words would, if effective,
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The word “here” is a hyperlink to Acme’s smart contract. Such a clause
would be similar to a contractual writing that seeks to incorporate the
contents of another writing. An arbitration clause, for example, might not
describe how arbitration will work, but stipulate that it shall proceed in
accordance the rules of the American Arbitration Association. The above
clause on Acme’s website similarly seeks to bring the design of the glassbox smart contract into the terms of the legal contract. Like the words
“NONSTANDARD VENDING MACHINE,” it puts users who read it on
notice that they should not rely on expectations they might otherwise have
about what they are purchasing. But the clause does more. It attempts to
stipulate that that by using Acme’s smart contract, users are agreeing not
only to transactions as they are described on the website, but also to the
software’s design.
The above text differs from standard incorporation clauses in that it
calls not on another writing, but on a piece of technology. In order to fully
understand the terms of the legal contract, the user must read the code. To
mark this distinction, I shall call language that seeks to add a smart
contract’s code to the interpretive evidence of the parties’ agreement a
“smincorporation clause.” If a smincorporation clause is effective, the terms
of the legal contract depend in part on the code of the associated smart
contract.65
Would or should courts give legal effect to a smincorporation clause
such as the above? As with contracts of adhesion, the answer shoud turn in
part on user sophistication.66 Suppose Acme offers no trades valued at less
than a million dollars, and that its website targets only professionals who
operate like “as is” or “Use at your own risk,” shifting risks of software bugs to the
user. The example is kept simple because courts might not, and arguably should
not, apply the same rules to risk-shifting clauses as to clauses that seek to
incorporate a smart contract’s design.
65
Although the possibility of smincorporation has not been widely recognized, the
International Swaps and Derivatives Association’s 2019 Guidelines for Smart
Derivatives Contracts recommend that drafters consider whether to smincorporate
code:
It may . . . be necessary for the legal documentation to expressly declare
that the code forms part of the single agreement as created by the ISDA
documentation. Consideration should be given to whether this would be
limited to records generated by operation of the code, or whether it should
actually attempt to capture all actions performed by the code.
ISDA Legal Guidelines, supra note 20 at 22.
66
See Chamber of Digital Commerce, 12 Use Cases, supra note 36 at 41 (“As with
clickwrap agreements, courts will need to develop standards to determine when a
smart contract or term therein will be enforced, and they will likely employ notice
as a key determinant. In the case of smart contracts where the “code is the
contract,” parties may experience more difficulty proving that they provided notice
of terms contained in the code, especially with less sophisticated customers.”).
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have the resources to understand the code. In that case, it would not be
unreasonable to enforce the clause and treat the design of the code as part
of the interpretive evidence. Smincorporation allows Acme to shift
resources away from explaining on the website every aspect of its offer and
toward improving the quality of the code or offering users a better price.
What if Acme were to offer low-value trades and target the general
public? Unlike the words “NONSTANDARD VENDING MACHINE,”
Acme’s smincorporation clause expressly tells users to look to the code’s
design to understand what they are purchasing. As such, courts might be
more open to enforcing it, and so to treating the code as part of the
interpretive evidence.
A court taking this approach might additionally adopt either or both
of the protective rules mentioned above: reasonable expectations and
substantive unconscionability. Under the first, code that violates an
unsophisticated user’s reasonable expectations would not be included in
the interpretive evidence. Unexpected design elements might then breach
the legal contract, despite Acme’s attempt to smincorporate the code.
Under the second, substantively unfair or unreasonably one-sided aspects
of the code’s design would not figure into the interpretive evidence of the
legal terms, and their operation might again constitute breach.
It is also possible, however, that courts would—and I believe
should—take the third path described above. When given to
unsophisticated users, courts should decline to give a smincorporation
clause legal effect and refuse to treat the smart contract code as interpretive
evidence of the legal contract. Acme’s clause asks unsophisticated users to
agree to code they would be unable to understand even if they took the
time to examine it. To treat the code as part of their agreement would
involve not only a legal fiction—that users read standard terms—but
science fiction—an assumption that users have capacities that we know
they do not possess. Rather than imposing on nonsophisticated parties the
costs of noncomprehension, it is fairer and more efficient to require that
Acme explain terms in language its target users can understand.
From this point forward, assume that only sophisticated traders use
Acme’s glass-box smart contract of adhesion, that Acme’s website includes
the above smincorporation clause, and that, because the users are
sophisticated, the clause is legally effective. We have now arrived at a
second example in which a smart contract’s code figures into the
interpretive evidence of an associated legal contract—in which code partly
determines legal terms. In the case of a mutually programmed smart
contract, the code belonged to the interpretive evidence because it was part
of the course of performance, and as such was highly probative of the
parties’ actual agreement. In a smincorporated glass-box contract of
adhesion, the code belongs to the interpretive evidence because the parties
have so stipulated. They have agreed to bind themselves to the code’s
design.
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I have argued that the code of a mutually programmed smart
contract constitutes course of performance evidence. Cohney and Hoffman
suggest that this is true of smart contract code generally.67 This is incorrect
when parties have smincorporated an adhesive smart contract.
Smincorporating code is more like choosing to memorialize part of the
agreement in a technical argot or usage of trade.68
Smincorporation of the smart contract does not entail that the code
is the only evidence of the parties’ contractual agreement and the terms of
their contract. In the example, Acme’s website contains many
representations about how the system operates and what users can expect.
These various forms of evidence might in some instances point in different
directions. Suppose, for example, Acme’s website states that certain
transactions shall be executed at 5:00 pm Eastern on the date of sale, but
the code is designed to execute at midnight. How such a conflict in the
interpretive evidence be resolved?
Contract law gives courts several tools to handle such situations.
One is to engage in an all-things-considered analysis of how a reasonable
user would likely understand the interpretive evidence.69 A court might
conclude, for example, that users are more likely to treat the words on
Acme’s website as dispositive than they are the code. Alternatively, a court
might apply the rule of contra proferentem, which preferences
interpretations against the drafter’s interests.70 Because Acme created both
its website and smart contract, that rule would suggest whichever reading is
preferred by the nondrafting user.
Acme might seek to avoid these results by adding additional
language to its smincorporation clause. A standard integration clause
stipulates that the contractual writing in which it appears is the final, and
therefore legally dispositive, statement of some or all of the parties’
agreement. When effective, an integration clause limits parties’ ability to
rely on evidence from outside the writing—“parol evidence”—to identify
the terms of their legal contract. Thus Cohney and Hoffman suggest that the
drafter of a contractual writing might integrate it against contrary elements
in an associated smart contract’s code.71 And the International Swaps and
Derivatives Associate recommends “include[ing] some provision within the
smart derivatives contract stating that the natural language version of the
contract will prevail in the event of any inconsistencies.”72 (Such clauses
67

Cohney & Hoffman, supra note 4 at 368.
“Usage of trade” is sometimes used to refer to common practices within an
industry, and at other times used to refer to special meanings words have in an
industry.
69
See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 202 (1981).
70
See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 206 (1981).
71
Cohney & Hoffman, supra note 4 at 390.
72
ISDA, Legal Guidelines for Smart Derivatives Contracts: The ISDA Master
Agreement 33 (February 2019). The ISDA suggests that if drafters do not take this
68
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would not be necessary if there were a clear legal default that smart
contracts of adhesion do not serve as interpretive evidence of the parties’
agreement.)
What if Acme wants the code to control? It might then add the
following notice to its enrollment page:
By enrolling on this website you agree to abide by all transactions
executed by our smart contract, even if those transactions are
contrary to Acme’s statements or representations on this website or
elsewhere. You can find the smart contract here. Please examine the
code closely to ensure that you understand its design.
The italicized language is akin to a integration clause, as it aims to limit
evidence of the parties agreement. But rather than identifying a contractual
writing as dispositive, it designates the smart contract‘s code as such. In
order to mark the difference, I call this a “smintigration clause.”73
Although integration clauses are widely used, they are not always
effective. The Draft Restatement of the Law of Consumer Contracts, for
example, suggests that a business’s attempt to integrate its standard terms—
the small print few if any consumers read—will not exclude evidence of the
business’s contrary consumer-directed representations.74
Since the standard contract terms do not result from a combined
effort by both parties to draft a negotiated agreement, there is less
justification to view them as a joint affirmative memorialization of a
mutually designed agreement, and thus less reason to allow them to
override affirmations of fact or promises made to the consumer.75
route, they should include a provision “ensuring there is some mechanism in place
to confirm, to the extent necessary, that the legal effect of any coded part of the
smart derivatives contract has been appropriately validated by lawyers.” Id.
73
The possibility of integrating code against other interpretive evidence is not
widely recognized in the literature, but see Lingwall & Mogallapu, supra note 21 at
299 (suggesting that “the parties may use code to express the entire agreement, so
that the code becomes the integrated contract”).
74
“A standard contract term that contradicts, unreasonably limits, or fails to give
the reasonably intended effect to a prior affirmation of fact or promise by the
business does not constitute a final expression of the agreement regarding the
subject matter of that term and does not have the effect under the parol evidence
rule of discharging obligations that would otherwise arise as a result of the prior
affirmation of fact or promise.” Restatement of the Law of Consumer Contracts § 8
(Am. Law Inst., Tentative Draft, April 18, 2019).
75
Id. cmt. 1. See also id. cmt. 3 (“Because consumers are not likely to notice, read,
or understand the effect of . . . merger clauses, they do not control the conclusion
of whether the standard contract terms constitute a partially or completely
integrated agreement, and thus do not preclude a finding that the standard contract
terms do not constitute the parties’ final expression of a particular matter.”).
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I have stipulated that Acme’s glass-box smart contract targets not
consumers, but sophisticated investors. Nonetheless, a court might apply
similar reasoning to Acme’s smintigration clause. Whereas an integration
clause stipulates which communicative acts figure into the interpretive
evidence, a smintigration clause attempts to stipulate that software design
decisions can exclude evidence of contrary express commitments. A court
might question whether the design of a smart contract of adhesion should
be permitted to override express natural language affirmations or
commitments made to users of it. Nor is smintigration comparable to an “as
is” or “Use at your own risk.”76 Whereas those contractual mechanisms
allocate the risk of unknown or unintended departures from the parties’
express agreement—bugs—a smintigration clause seeks to shift the risk of
departures that one side built into the design of its smart contract.
That said, once can also imagine courts giving legal effect to a
smintigration clause between sophisticated parties. Such parties might have
good reasons for wanting to smintigrate a glass-box contract of adhesion.
Judicial interpretation of natural language is neither predictable nor
perfectly accurate. If both parties know the code, a smintigration clause
might reduce the risk that a court will later misinterpret their
communications. And a party who has not written the code might have
other reasons, such as reputation and repeat play, to trust that the code is
designed to do what that party expects. If these grounds provide the
nonprogramming party all the assurances it needs, smintigration can serve
to prevent courts from later clouding the waters by misinterpreting one or
both parties’ other statements or actions.77 Lastly, smintigration does not
extinguish all legal protections against code that does not conform to
communications. A party who intentionally programs a smart contract in
ways that are contrary to other representations commits promissory fraud,
against which the parol evidence rule is no defense.78 Anglo-American
contract law gives parties a remarkable degree of control over the
framework rules that govern the construction and enforcement of their legal
agreements. Courts might well extend that attitude to sophisticated parties’
attempts to smintigrate smart contracts.
76

For thoughts on how a smintigration clause might be drafted to also allocate the
risk of errors in the code, see supra note 64.
77
The point here is parallel to observations about how non-contextual approaches
to contractual writings can, by rendering legal contracts more predictable and less
malleable, enable parties’ reliance on extra-legal forms of trust. See Lisa Bernstein,
Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent
Business Norms, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1765, 1787-95 (1996); Robert E. Scott, Conflict
and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 2005, 2050–53 (1987).
78
See Ian Ayres & Gregory Klass, Promissory Fraud without Breach, 2004 Wis. L.
Rev. 507, 520-22 (discussing actions for promissory fraud where an action for
breach is precluded by the parol evidence rule).
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But even if they do, the rules governing attempts to smintigrate
smart contracts should not track those for the integration of contractual
writings. Many U.S. courts have held that a contractual writing that does
not contain an integration clause might nonetheless be found to be
integrated if it appears to be a final statement of some or all of the parties’
agreement.79 The best argument for that rule is that when parties sign a
contractual writing that appears to be legally binding, they should
understand that it has a special legal effect—that it is likely to exclude parol
evidence of contrary or additional terms. It is difficult to imagine a court
finding the implied smintigration of a glass-box smart contract of adhesion.
The reason should by now be familiar. The mere fact that a user is given
access to a smart contract’s code does not put them on notice that its design
or operation is likely to displace other evidence of the parties’ agreement.
Code should displace other interpretive evidence only when the parties
have expressly agreed that it shall.
One should also keep in mind that, for all its power, the parol
evidence rule concerns only the evidence that goes into interpreting the
parties’ contractual agreement. As I have emphasized, the terms of a legal
contract are rarely coextensive with the parties’ agreement. Default terms,
such as implied warranties, apply absent evidence of the parties’ contrary
agreement. And mandatory terms, such as the duty of good faith, apply
even in the face of the parties’ contrary agreement. And other aspects of the
transaction might give rise to a defense such as mistake, duress, or
misrepresentation. All this mean that no matter how completely parties are
able to smintigrate their glass-box smart contract, the code will not fully
determine the resulting legal state of affairs. Contract law is designed to give
parties the terms they choose. But that is not all it is designed to do.
I have so far been discussing attempts to smincorporate operational
sections of the code into the parties’ legal contract, or to smintigrate
operational code against contrary interpretive evidence. Software can also
contain nonoperational comments. Should one party be able to
smincorporate or smintigrate programmer comments contained in a glassbox smart contract of adhesion?
Unlike operational sections of the code, programmer comments are
communicative acts, typically formulated in natural language. Anglo79

See, e.g., Vanhook Enterprises, Inc. v. Kay & Kay Contracting, LLC, 543 S.W.3d
569, 572 (Ky. 2018) (“As a matter of law, a document which on its face appears to
be a complete integration is a complete integration.”); Coll v. PB Diagnostic
Systems, Inc., 50 F.3d 1115, 1123 (1st Cir. 1995) (“Where the parties reduce an
agreement to a writing which in view of its completeness and specificity reasonably
appears to be a complete agreement, it is taken to be an integrated agreement
unless it is established by other evidence that the writing did not constitute a final
expression.”); Bellman v. Am. Int’l. Grp., 865 N.E.2d 853, 857 (Ohio 2007) (“A
contract that appears to be a complete and unambiguous statement of the parties’
contractual intent is presumed to be an integrated writing.”).
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American contract law imposes few requirements on how parties express
their contractual agreement. (Contractual writings aimed at consumers are
more likely to be subject to typeface or other requirements.80) There is no
principled reason why the creator of a glass-box smart contract given to
sophisticated users could not, if it provided sufficient notice, include legally
effective comments in the code. Sufficient notice is, however, key. Because
parties are unlikely to expect aspects of their contractual agreement to
appear in comments buried in the code, such comments should be given
legal effect only where there has been clear and presumptively effective
notice of them—when they have been expressly smincorporated in
communications outside the code. Similarly, an attempt to smintigrate
programmer comments should be effective only if it appears outside the
code.
These notice rules need not be written in stone. Contemporary
judicial treatments of browsewrap, for example, reflect cultural practices
and understandings, which might change over time. Suppose that as
browsewrap becomes increasingly common, users come to expect
(correctly or not) that by accessing a website they will be legally bound to
unread browsewrap terms, no matter the quality of the notice.81 If common
cultural understandings shift in this direction, courts will have a new reason
hold that using a webpage that links to browsewrap expresses the user’s
assent to the browsewrap terms, no matter the quality of notice. If that
happens, browsewrap will have become a self-fulfilling prophesy.
One can imagine a similar shift in the common understanding of
using a glass-box smart contract of adhesion. To return to Cohney and
Hoffman’s suggestion, perhaps someday the mere use of a glass-box smart
contract, together with a link to the code, might be widely understood to
express the user’s agreement to the content of that smart contract—to the
operations the code is designed to perform and to any contractual writings
embedded as comments in it. In that case, courts might not require express
smincorporation of the code.
Perhaps. But such a change would involve a much more radical
shift in common understanding than a new rule for browsewrap.
Browsewrap is a type of contractual writing. It is not merely evidence of the
parties agreement, but says what that agreement is. To repeat a point I have
been emphasizing throughout, a glass-box smart contract is first and
foremost a mechanism for doing something. Although one can imagine a
80

See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4544 (McKinney 2020) (providing that the drafter of a
printed consumer contract or residential lease may put the document into evidence
only if the print is clear and legible and in 8-point type or larger).
81
This change in common understanding might happen whether or not courts treat
browsewrap as legally enforceable. Some studies suggest that consumers often
believe themselves to be bound by terms that are legally unenforceable. See, e.g.,
Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, A Psychological Account of Consent to Fine Print, 99 U.
Iowa L. Rev. 1745 (2014).

44

How to Interpret a Vending Machine (DRAFT)
world in which code is impliedly smincorporated into the parties legal
contract, or even impliedly smintigrated against other interpretive evidence
of the parties actual agreement, it would be radically different from the one
we live in.
The results of this section can be summarized as follows. First, the
fact that users have access to the code is not sufficient reason to treat the
contents of a glass-box smart contract of adhesion as interpretive evidence
of the parties’ contractual agreement. Mere access to the code does not put
users, regardless of their sophistication, on notice that its design or
comments contained in it might affect their legal rights and responsibilities.
This distinguishes glass-box smart contracts of adhesion from mutually
programmed smart contracts, as the latter always qualify as evidence of the
parties’ agreement. Second, in transactions between sophisticated parties
we might expect courts to enforce parties’ express agreement to
incorporate, or to smincorporate, the contents of a glass-box smart contract
of adhesion. Smincorporation might apply to both the code’s design and to
contractual comments imbedded in it. There are, however, good reasons to
reject attempts at smincorporation in transactions with nonsophisticated
parties. Third, by the same token courts might enforce sophisticated parties’
attempts to integrate, or smintigrate, the contents of their smart contract
against other interpretive evidence of their contractual agreement. That is, a
court might enforce an agreement between sophisticated parties that their
legal obligations shall be determined in the first instance solely by the
code’s design and comments, despite other contrary evidence. Again,
agreements with nonsophisticates should be treated differently. Fourth,
unlike the integration of a contractual writing, both the smincorporation
and the smintigration of a smart contract should require the parties’ express
agreement. Fifth and finally, even when a smart contract is fully
smintigrated, the parties’ legal contract is likely to include terms that are not
expressed in its design or comments. The terms of a legal contract are rarely
coextensive with the parties’ agreement, including when they agree to be
bound by a piece of software.
5. Smart Contracts and Legal Contracts
Parts Two, Three and Four have gone fairly deep into the doctrinal
weeds. Having explored those details, it is now possible to step back to
examine the relationship between smart contracts and legal contracts
generally.
Many scholars have emphasized the technical limits of smart
contracts. It is difficult to imagine how a smart contract might be
programmed to implement familiar standards such as reasonableness, good
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faith or due diligence, which contracting parties often wish to employ.82
Systems that implement code do not have the resources to recognize or fill
gaps in an agreement.83 The practical inevitability of programming errors
means that parties should never rely solely on the operation of code to
secure intended outcomes.84 Conditioning software on events in the world
requires the use of oracles—software or hardware that provides inputs from
outside the smart contract—creating points of possible failure and
exploitation.85 When a smart contract is run on blockchain, it may be
difficult to modify or terminate.86 And the out-of-pocket costs of running
code on a distributed ledger could mean that only the simplest of smart
contracts can practicably employ the technology.87
These technical limitations are important. But there is a broader
point to be made. Smart contracts are designed to do only one of the many
jobs of a legal contract: solving the basic mistrust problem. An exclusive
focus on this function reflects an anemic understanding of what contract
law does and suggests a false picture of the forms of sociability to which
contract law applies.
This Part argues that point by first reexamining the story of the 2016
DAO project (hereinafter “The DAO”) and its subsequent hack. The story is
often told to illustrate the technical limitations of smart contracts. Its plot
elements include software bugs, blockchain inflexibility, and the costs of
anonymity. But The DAO also embodied a simplistic understanding of what
legal contracts do, and reflected the misguided ambitions of some smart
contract enthusiasts. The second section distinguishes the form of
prepackaged coordination that characterized The DAO, and that appears in
smart contracts generally, from forms of sociability common in contractual
transactions. The third section discusses the multiple functions of contract
law—beyond solving the basic mistrust problem—and argues that they
suggest a cautious approach to the idea of using smart contracts to supplant
rather than supplement legal contracts.
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5.1

The Parable of The DAO

The DAO (decentralized autonomous organization) was an
organizational form embedded in a smart contract run on the Ethereum
blockchain and was designed to create a crowd-funded venture capital
fund that would operate without fund managers or a centralized governing
body.88 Funds in the form of a virtual currency, Ether, were to be raised
through the sale of tokens to the public, permitting token holders to
participate in the fund’s management. Once funding was complete, token
holders—whom the technology allowed to remain anonymous—were to
have voting rights in decisions regarding which projects The DAO would
fund. Because the code was run on a distributed ledger, it could be read by
those with the technical skill to do so and was nearly impossible to alter
once put into motion. Over the course of a 29-day token sale in May 2016,
The DAO raised from thousands of investors approximately 12 million
Ether, which at the time had a value of $150 million. The project collapsed
the next month when one or more users exploited a vulnerability in the
code to siphon off Ether worth in the neighborhood of $55 million.
The DAO was a glass-box smart contract of adhesion. Many or most
of the investors did not participate in writing the code, but had access to it
through the distributed ledger. The DAO is especially interesting in this
context not only because of its epic hack, but also for the several ways its
creators attempted to determine the smart contract’s legal effects. Part Four
identified two mechanism the provider of a glass-box smart contract of
adhesion might use to attempt to alter codes’ effect on a legal contract:
smincorporation and smintigration. The documentation surrounding The
DAO attempted both, plus a third.
The DAO came with two sets of salient contractual writings: a
website describing the project and a readme file bundled with the code.
The DAO website included a browsewrap terms page. At the top of the
landing and other pages was a link labelled “Terms,” which directed users
to a webpage titled “Terms: Explainer of Terms and Disclaimers.” The first
paragraph of that Terms page reads as follows:
The terms of The DAO Creation are set forth in the smart contract
code existing on the Ethereum blockchain at [address]. Nothing in
this explanation of terms or in any other document or
communication may modify or add any additional obligations or
guarantees beyond those set forth in The DAO’s code. Any and all
explanatory terms or descriptions are merely offered for educational
88

This article’s account of The DAO draws primarily from the Security and
Exchange Commission’s Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934: The DAO, Release No. 81207 (July 25, 2017),
available at https://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-81207.pdf (last visited
May 12, 2020).
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purposes and do not supercede or modify the express terms of The
DAO’s code set forth on the blockchain; to the extent you believe
there to be any conflict or discrepancy between the descriptions
offered here and the functionality of The DAO’s code at [address],
The DAO’s code controls and sets forth all terms of The DAO
Creation.89
Several paragraphs later, the page addresses the same topic more
expansively.
The DAO’s smart contract code governs the Creation of DAO
tokens and supercede any public statements about The DAO’s
Creation made by third parties or individuals associated with The
DAO, past, present and future.90
These are combined smincorporation and smintigration clauses. The first is
the more limited one. It seeks to smintegrate the code against contrary
statements on The DAO website. The second seeks to smintegrate the code
against all other communications. In other words, the second clause seeks
to stipulate that the smart contract shall be the only interpretive evidence of
the parties’ contractual agreement.
The Terms page is not a model of legal precision. Although it states
that the website does not create any contractual relations, it also purports to
effect a number of legal changes that are contractual in nature.91 More
interesting for the present purposes, however, is the readme file bundled
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Explanation of Terms and Disclaimer, DAOHUB,
https://daohub.org/explainer.html, archived at INTERNET ARCHIVE,
https://web.archive.org/web/20160704190119/https://daohub.org/explainer.html
(captured on Jul. 4, 2016) (last visited May 10, 2020).
90
Id.
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The Explainer of Terms and Disclaimers page states, for example, that by clicking
“I Accept,” the user agreed to “tak[e] part in The DAO’s Creation under the terms
set forth in The DAO’s smart contract code at [the user’s] own risk,” and that if the
user is acting on behalf of an entity, the user warrants that the user has “legal
authority to bind that entity to these terms as set forth in The DAO’s smart contract
code.” The page then lists a number of representations and warranties that the user
makes “[b]y interacting with The DAO’s smart contract code.” And in two allcaps
paragraphs, it provides that the user expressly agrees to use The DAO at the user’s
sole risk, without any express or implied warranties, and “to the fullest extent
permitted by any applicable law” to “not hold third parties or individuals
associated with the DAO creation liable for any and all damages or injury
whatsoever caused by or related to use of, or inability to use, DAO tokens or the
DAO platform.”
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with the smart contract on the distributed ledger.92 This file contained
several provisions that sought to go beyond smincorporation and
smintigration.
Like the Terms page, the readme file purports to effect several
contractual changes. For example, it grants users a GNU license to the code
and disclaims any warranties. At the same time, several clauses appear to
stipulate that use of The DAO will not produce a legal contract. Buried in a
section disclaiming any legal advice one finds two especially interesting
sentences: “Your use of the Software does not, in and of itself, create a
legally binding contract in any jurisdiction.” And: “You agree that in order
for you to form a legally binding contract that you shall seek legal advice
from an appropriately qualified and experienced lawyer within your
jurisdiction.”93 Along the same lines, the readme file elsewhere provides:
Although the word “contract” is used in the DAO code, the term is
a programming convention and is not being used as a legal term of
art. The DAO does not practice law and the authors of this code do
not practice law are not your lawyers. The term is a programming
convention, not a representation that the code is in and of itself a
legally binding and enforceable contract.
Taken together, these provisions read like a TINALEA (“This is not an
enforceable agreement”) clause: a written provision that seeks to opt-out of
legal enforcement altogether.
One often finds TINALEA clauses in letters of intent or preliminary
agreements—documents generated in the course of negotiations and used
to clarify points of agreement and outstanding issues. Adding a TINALEA
clause to such documents permits the parties to generate the written
clarification while maintaining the ability to back out of the deal. Another
common site of TINALEA clauses is employee handbooks. Here the
employer seeks to communicate its policies without effecting a change to
its employment contracts.
The TINALEA provisions in The DAO readme file try to do
something very different. Rather than excluding a writing from the
interpretive evidence of an anticipated or an existing legal contract, these
clauses attempt to opt-out of legal enforcement altogether. The Terms page
states that the only contractual commitments are those in the smart
contract, and the smart contract states that its “use . . . does not, in and of
itself, create a legally binding contract.” Whereas smincorporation and
smintigration clause seek to affect how the code will figure into the
interpretive evidence of legal contract, these provisions seek to replace the
92

Stephan Tual, Updated Readme, GITHUB: SLOCKIT/ DAO (Apr. 11, 2016),
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legal contract with a smart contract. I suggest calling contractual writings
that state that the use of a smart contract shall not generate a legal contract
“SMINALEA clauses” (“[This] smart contract is not a legally enforceable
agreement”).
Section 21 of the Second Restatement provides that a TINALEA
clause “may prevent the formation of a contract.”94 The comments explain
that an attempt to opt-out of legal enforcement might not be effective
“where a bargain has been fully or partly performed on one side, a failure
to perform on the other side may result in unjust enrichment,” or where the
clause is determined to be “against public policy because it unreasonably
limits recourse to the courts or as unconscionably limiting the remedies for
breach of contract.”95 There is, however, relatively little caselaw in this
area. And there are as of yet no judicial decisions on the effects of
SMINALEA clauses.
It would be interesting to think through whether courts would or
should give effect to an unambiguous SMINALEA clause. More salient to
my purposes, however, is a different question: What do participants in a
smart contract stand to gain and to lose from opting out of legal
enforcement?
To repeat a point I have been emphasizing, both legal contracts and
smart contracts can be used to solve the basic mistrust problem. The DAO
smart contract sought to solve it by locking users into a piece of software
that they could read but not alter. The thought experiments in Parts Two
through Four have identified two other salient functions the law serves that
relate to potential breaches of trust. Laws of deception provide assurances
of honesty, especially at the time of formation. And some default and
mandatory obligations, such as the duty of good faith, provide assurances
that parties will not engage in opportunism. A smart contract designed to
solve the basic mistrust problem—say by running accessible code on a
distributed ledger—might not be capable of serving these other functions.
The DAO hack illustrates the point. Although the readme file
explained that “[t]his code been reviewed by hundreds of pairs of eyes from
our community and by one of the most respected auditing company in the
world,”96 the code in fact contained a bug that permitted one or more
anonymous users to transfer $55 million from investment pool to their own
accounts. This is a classic form of opportunism. The hacker or hackers took
advantage of a flaw in the code to extract from the transaction a benefit that
was not part of the bargain at the expense of other participants.
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Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 21 (1981).
Id. cmt. b. A TINALEA clauses might also be ineffective when the agreement
qualifies as a partnership, such as in The DAO. See Rodriguez, supra note 19 at
706-07.
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Updated Readme, supra note 92.
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The flaw in The DAO code is comparable to an error in a
contractual writing.97 In fact, when, prior to the hack, The DAO
programmers unsuccessfully attempted to fix the bug, they included in-line
commentary explaining that the change was intended to prevent just the
sort of hack that later occurred.98
Contract law provides multiple tools for dealing with such errors. If
the mistake originated in the transcription of the parties’ agreement into a
contractual writing, a so-called “scrivener’s error,” a court might reform the
writing.99 Standard rules of interpretation also provide protections. The
words in a contractual writing are always “read as a whole to determine its
purpose and intent.”100 Thus Samuel Williston—as ardent a textualist as
any—explained in the first edition of his treatise that
in giving effect to the general meaning of a writing particular words
are sometimes wholly disregarded, or supplied. Thus “or” may be
given the meaning of “and,” or vice versa, if the remainder of the
agreement shows that a reasonable person in the position of the
parties would so understand it.101
Another tool for dealing with errors is the mistake defense. A material
mistake of fact by one or both parties can give the disadvantaged side the
power to rescind the contract and bring an action for unjust enrichment.102
The unconscionability doctrine also can be used to prevent the
enforcement of terms that involve unfair surprise and are unreasonably onesided.103 And as explained above, the mandatory duty of good faith can
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prevent one party from taking advantage of unintended loopholes in a
contractual writing.104
Had The DAO been organized as a multilateral legal contract
between identified investors, a court could have used one or more of these
tools to sort out the mess created by the flaw in its code—even though the
code was both smincorporated into the legal contract and smintigrated
against extrinsic communications. A court would likely treat the flaw in the
code as just that: not an element of the parties’ agreement, but an error
calling for reformation and whose exploitation would give rise to an action
for breach. In other words, the users who were victims of the hack would
have the ability to recover money damages from those who hacked The
DAO. Jonathan Rohr notes the irony: “the consequences of the DAO
organizers’ attempt to opt-in to an extra-legal framework for the relationship
between and among holders of DAO tokens and other participants in the
enterprise are arguably best addressed by the legal framework that they
attempted to disclaim.”105
5.2

Prepackaged Coordination vs. Shared Cooperative Activities: The
Relational Aspects of Many Contractual Transactions

The DAO hack illustrates how an exclusive focus on contract law’s
role in solving one form of mistrust—worries about performance—can lead
to ignoring its role in addressing other forms of mistrust—worries about
deceptive and opportunistic behavior. But the hack was not the end of The
DAO story. This section discusses its aftermath and the fixed commitment
of some project participants to the idea a “trustless” social architecture.
That commitment suggests false pictures of contractual relationships and of
the form of sociability they embody. Most contractual relationships involve
ongoing adjustments and mutual responsiveness that presuppose some
degree of trust. Although contract law is designed to solve multiple mistrust
problems, it is designed also to accommodate trust and mutual
responsiveness. The architecture of a smart contract cannot.
Victims of The DAO hack had no legal recourse not because of the
SMINALEA cluses in the DAO’s readme file, but because the software
enabled users to remain anonymous. To date, no one knows who siphoned
off the $55 million dollars from the fund, making it impossible to find a
defendant.
With legal recourse off the table, The DAO’s creators addressed the
hack by altering the blockchain protocol going forward in a way that
returned the siphoned monies to the fund. In July 2016, a supermajority of
DAO token holders adopted the software updates needed to activate that
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new protocol.106 The effect was to transfer all funds raised, including those
that had been siphoned off, to a new chain, permitting token holders to
exchange their tokens for cryptocurrency. A vocal minority of participants
declined to accept the fix, arguing that it violated The DAO’s original
vision: governance by code. The result was a hard fork in the code—a
permanent divergence from the previous blockchain. Holders of a majority
of tokens shifted to the new, forked Ethereum blockchain; a minority
continue to use what is now known as “Ethereum Classic.”
At least a few of The DAO token holders who rejected the hard fork
did so for principled reasons. In July 2016, a group calling itself “The
Ethereum Classic Community” released a four-page unsigned document
titled, “The Ethereum Classic Declaration of Independence.”107 The
Declaration raises numerous objections to the hard fork, many founded on
a specific vision of governance by code, according to which “code is law.”
The authors emphasize the value of the immutability and fungibility of
distributed-ledger smart contracts, which immunize users against “the
subjective morality judgments” of those who might consider those
individual’s actions wrongful—including the judgments of a majority of
other users, or “the ‘tyranny of the majority.’” The argument assumes moral
relativism and a strong commitment to individual choice. “In a global
community, where each individual has their own laws, customs, and
beliefs, who is to say what is right and wrong?” The blockchain protects
individual choice and judgment by enabling a form of governance that is
“censorship-resistant, trustless and immutable.” A person’s choice to opt
into the code binds them to its rules, and because those rules are fixed and
apply to the community as a whole, fully protects them against interference
by others.
The Declaration’s picture of governance by code—or lex
cryptographia108—recalls a familiar reading of Thomas Hobbes.109 On this
reading, the social contract is an arrangement between fearful rational
egoists, each of whom agrees to the sovereign’s command only in order to
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protect himself from others.110 So long as the sovereign is itself composed of
people, however, there remains a risk of infringement or exploitation.
Subjecting oneself to a human sovereign means not yet fully escaping the
state of nature.111 If code can be made impersonal, discretionless and
immutable, a governance system where “code is law” can be entirely
trustless. In such a system, individual users are free to pursue their own
aims without fear of interference by or the judgment of anyone, be it other
citizens or the sovereign.
The Declaration’s picture of a “truly free and trustless computer” is a
radical one. That said, it is consistent with a familiar picture of how law in
general, and contract law in particular, work. The picture of law is the that
of the sovereign’s command backed by force.112 It is law as compulsion.
The relevant picture of contract is what Ian Macneil labels “presentation”:
[Presentiation] is a recognition that the course of the future is so
unalterably bound by present conditions that the future has been
brought effectively into the present so that it may be dealt with just
as if it were in fact the present. Thus, the presentiation of a
transaction involves restricting its expected future effects to those
defined in the present, i.e., at the inception of the transaction.113
110

Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996)
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Macneil argues that “traditional contract theory created a legal structure
which in theory attempted to presentiate not just part of the relation
between contracting parties, but virtually all of it.”114 Or to put the point in
contemporary terms, traditional contract theory pictured the ideal legal
contract as a present act of choice that secures the parties’ desired
outcomes in all possible future states of the world. “The aim was to
establish, insofar as the law could, the entire relation at the time of the
expression of mutual assent.”115 The Declaration envisions a similar act of
presentiation in computer code. By binding themselves to an immutable,
impersonal code, users can act today to determine their collective futures
going forward.
There are several reasons to doubt both the viability and the
wisdom of such projects. One, illustrated by The DAO, is the persistence of
coding errors.116 Equally important is our lack of foresight. Code that has
been designed for possible futures F1 through Fn might not serve the parties’
needs in future Fn+1.117 There is, however a deeper problem. The idea of
complete presentiation relies on a false picture of contractual relationships.
The error can be put in terms of Michael Bratman’s analysis of
acting together. Bratman distinguishes “prepackaged coordination” from
“shared cooperative activities.” You and I engage in prepackaged
coordination when we intend to engage together in some joint activity J—
singing a duet, painting a house, taking a walk—and “we work out, in
advance, just what roles we each will play in our J-ing.”118 In a prepackaged
duet, for example, each singer sings her part on tempo and in key, but does
not modulate her own performance in response to the other’s. “[W]e each
go off and play our role with no further interaction with the other: there is
no responsiveness in action.”119
Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. Cal. L. Rev. 691, 800-804 (1974)
(discussing the idea of presentiation in traditional contract theory).
114
Macneil, Restatement (Second), supra, at 592.
115
Id. at 593.
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See Cohney & Hoffman, supra note 4, at 337, 358.
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This is another way of putting the point that smart contracts entail higher
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Sklaroff, supra note 28 at 291.
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Michael E. Bratman, Shared Cooperative Activity, in Faces of Intention: Selected
Essays on Intention and Agency 93, 106 (1999), originally in 101 Phil. Rev. 327
(1992).
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Id. Danah Boyd suggests that programmers often attempt to parse social
relations in terms something like prepackaged coordination.
As geeks, we were trained to separate policy and mechanism through
systems courses. We rely on people to figure out the policies, not realizing
that we've framed what is possible through our technology.
From an autistic perspective, social life can and must be
programmatically and algorithmically processed and understood on
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Although prepackaged coordination is possible,120 it is not
characteristic of agreements to engage in projects together, or what
Bratman calls “shared cooperative activities.” Agreements commonly
anticipate a degree of flexibility and mutual responsiveness in their
performance, as well as various forms of trust along the way. At the outset,
participants understand their shared plan to be incomplete and even
defeasible, that the details are to be filled in together depending on how
things go. They do not commit themselves to fixed courses of action, but to
working together to advance the interests of each and of both. Joint projects
of this type does not require that each participant fully commit herself to the
other’s ends. “A joint activity can be cooperative down to a certain level
and yet competitive beyond that.”121 But they do involve an expectation—
or trust—that each will exercise her discretion in accord with the other and
with the plan’s broader purposes.
This is, of course, Macneil’s point about contractual transactions.122
Although complete presentiation might be possible in a truly discrete
exchange transaction123—“the cash purchase of gasoline at a station on the
New Jersey Turnpike by someone rarely travelling the road”124— the vast
majority of contractual exchanges both require and anticipate flexibility.
Macneil identifies a host of reasons why this is so. Because the future is not
entirely known, complete presentiation is not possible in transactions that
simplistic categorical levels. The nuanced relationships that people
regularly manage in everyday life are boiled down to segmented
possibilities.
Autistic Social Software, (2004), available at:
http://www.danah.org/papers/Supernova2004.html (reprinted in Best Software
Writing I 35 (Joel Spolsky ed. 2005)).
120
The example of the two singers might have seemed fanciful in 1992, when
Bratman published his essay. During a pandemic that requires social distancing
and with a much more advanced internet, it is a familiar musical genre.
121
Id. at 107. Bratman provides a somewhat technical description of the degree of
cooperation as follows:
So even if the participants have differing preferences about how they are to
J, neither participant will be in a position to pursue such preferences in
ways that by pass the other’s intentions/subplans. This makes it likely that
in such cases the demand on each agent that her plans be means-end
coherent will lead to rational pressure in the direction of bargaining that is
framed by the shared intention.
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Intention and Agency 109, 125 (1999), originally in 104 Ethics 97 (1993).
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Macneil’s relational contract theory, see Gregory Klass, A Conditional Intent to
Perform, 15 Legal Theory 107, 141-42 (2009).
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extend over time. Because it is difficult to anticipate how people will
choose, complete presentation is not possible where the transaction’s
success depends on acts within one or both parties’ control. Because
judgment is situation specific, complete presentation is not possible where
performance is not easily measured. Nor is complete presentiation possible
where the parties themselves anticipate future cooperative behavior; where
benefits and burdens are to be shared rather than allocated; where one or
both parties might choose to exit the relationship; where the “entangling
strings or friendship, reputation, interdependence, morality, and altruistic
desires are integral”; where “trouble is expected as a matter of course”; or
finally and more generally where “the participants never intend or expect to
see the whole future of the relation as presentiated at any single time, but
view the relation as an ongoing integration of behavior which will grow
and vary with events in a largely unforeseeable future.”125
Contracts scholars are not of one mind as to how the law should
take account of the relational aspects of contractual transactions. Macneil
argues that contract law and the adjudicators who apply it should become
more attuned to relational obligations. The legal reference point should not
be the original agreement, but “the entire relation as it has developed to the
time of” the dispute, and legal relief should be “in great (or even entire)
measure forward-looking, fashioned ad hoc on flexible and broadly
remedial lines.”126 Robert Scott, in distinction, argues that parties to
relational contracts often prefer contractual obligations that are off-the-rack,
binary and fixed, even if those obligations do not track their actual
agreement over time. Legal duties fixed at the beginning of the transaction
make room for extralegal forms of trust that can achieve flexibility at a
lower cost.
The parties, in essence, [learn] to behave under two sets of rules: a
strict set of rules for legal enforcement and a more flexible set of
rules for social enforcement. It may be that the great lesson for the
courts is that any effort to judicialize these social rules will destroy
the very informality that makes them so effective in the first
instance. . . . Understood in their broader context, binary legal rules
serve as an effective compliment to the more flexible means of
social adjustment.127
Where there is no disagreement, however, is that contractual transactions
typically involve a thicker web of expectations and obligations than is
captured in the contractual writing, and that the parties themselves benefit
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from flexibility in the performance of those obligations.128 Legal contracts
are not and should not be straight-jackets. They are more like a good parka:
designed to protect against the elements, but also to allow for freedom of
movement, to be unzipped when it gets too warm, and to be shed when no
longer necessary.
The Declaration’s commitment to governance by code utterly fails
to account for these aspects of human sociability and the corresponding
flexibility of the law of contracts. The claim that smart contracts might
eventually supplant even a limited range of legal contracts rests on a false
picture of contractual relationships.
5.3

What Legal Contracts Do

When Szabo coined the term, “smart contract” was a useful
metaphor. It leveraged a familiar fact about legal contracts—that they can
be used to solve the basic mistrust problem—to explain something one
might do with software. That heuristic enabled Szabo to explain how code
could be designed to do something similar to what many legal contracts do.
But like all metaphors, the similarity is only partial.
Contract law, and by extension legal contracts, do much more than
solve the basic mistrust problem.129 This is not the place for a complete
taxonomy of those functions. But a partial list will be useful in thinking
about the proper relationship between smart contracts and legal contracts.
Because breach makes for a good story, Parts Two through Four
focused on the law’s solutions to various mistrust problems. A mistrustful
party might worry that the other side will breach their agreement—a
problem a smart contract might solve. But they might also worry that the
other side is lying about or failing to disclose material information, or that
the other side might adhere to the letter of the agreement but not its spirit.
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The law provides multiple tools that address both deception and
opportunism, ranging from the tort of deceit to the mandatory duty of good
faith. If smart contracts are like legal contracts in that they can be designed
to solve basic mistrust problems, it is not obvious that they can address
these other forms of mistrust.
But contract law does more than enable exchanges between fearful
rational egoists. As H.L.A. Hart observed, the law does not only deter the
Holmesian “bad man” from committing wrongs. It also provides answers to
“the ‘puzzled man' or ‘ignorant man' who is willing to do what is required,
if only he can be told what it is.”130 Many rules of contract law are designed
to clarify what parties owe one another when something unexpected
happens. The rules for impracticability and frustration, anticipatory
repudiation, constructive conditions of exchange all serve this function.
Even the default remedies for breach can be viewed in this light. Again,
smart contracts provide only compulsion, not guidance.
As the discussion of the relational aspects of contractual
transactions suggests, legal contracts are also often structured to give parties
flexibility and discretion in the performance of their agreements. Both
contractual writings and default rules employ standards—good faith, best
efforts, reasonableness, and the like—that leave room for party choice in
their satisfaction. The rules for modifications, conditions, and waivers allow
the parties to alter their obligations as they go along. And the remedies for
breach do not compel performance—parties do not have the power to
penalize breach131—but merely require compensation for any unavoidable
harms that foreseeably resulted from nonperformance. Whether or not one
accepts the theory of efficient breach, it is difficult to deny that the
expectation measure gives parties the ability to choose breach when
performance becomes too expensive.132 Because a smart contract locks
users into prepackaged performances, this is not something it can
provide.133
Finally, the law of contracts is designed to do more than help parties
realize their own ends. It serves social interests whose realization does not
run through the satisfaction of party preferences. By marking defections
from exchange agreement as legal wrongs, contract law arguably supports
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the social moral practice of making and keeping agreements.134 By
attaching a remedy to breach, contract law can express a collective
judgment that such wrongs generate new obligations to make the other side
whole.135 By refusing to enforce some terms and mandating others—the
unconscionability rule, nonenforcement on the basis of public policy,
minim wage laws, the mandatory warranty of habitability, and so forth—
contract law reflects social assessments of the substantial fairness or public
harms of certain agreements. And by providing parties off-the-rack of legal
contracts with a mix of mandatory and default rules—employment,
partnership, franchise, consumer sales, and others—contract law can help
parties find their way into socially valued and personally valuable
relationships.136 These are not functions that a smart contract, programmed
or purchased by the parties, can perform.
What does all this say about whether courts would or should give
legal effect to attempts to replace legal contracts with smart contracts? It is
doubtful that a court would have given legal effect to The DAO’s
SMINALEA clauses, which were buried in the fine print of an adhesive
readme file, in section of the writing that was primarily a disclaimer of legal
advice, and which were not a model of clarity. The case would be stronger
if there were clear evidence that all participants had actively chosen to optout of legal lability, that no one was deceived in doing so, and that doing so
was unlikely to harm others. In such a case, one might well imagine a court
giving effect to a SMINALEA clause. Legal contractual obligations are, first
and foremost, chosen obligations. In addition to all of the above purposes,
contract law serves to expand our range of choices by allowing us to
develop and engage in new forms of acting together. If people want to
experiment with purely technological solutions to the basic mistrust
problem, why not let them try?
But the above analysis casts doubt the wisdom of such experiments.
The techno-utopian dream of governance by code rests on an anemic view
of human sociability—prepackaged coordination as distinguished from
134

See, e.g., Joseph Raz, Promises in Morality and Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 916, 937
(reviewing P.S. Atiyah, Promises, Morals, and Law (1981)) (arguing that Mill’s harm
principle “does not preclude the law from encouraging moral, cultural or other
valid goals”); Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise,
120 Harv. L. Rev. 708, 752 (2007) (arguing that contract law “is not an effort to
legalize as much as possible the interpersonal moral regime of promising, but
rather to provide support for the political and public values associated with
promising”).
135
See, e.g., Gardner, supra note 132, at 139-41 (describing contract law as serving
a corrective justice function).
136
See, e.g., Hanoch Dagan & Michael Heller, The Choice Theory of Contracts 76
(2017) (“[W]hen contract law offers us multiple contract types, it participates
in the ongoing social production of stable categories of human interaction by
consolidating people’s expectations of themselves and others. In this, law enlarges
the range of valuable options available to us.”).

60

How to Interpret a Vending Machine (DRAFT)
shared cooperative activities—and the law’s role in it. Julie Cohen observes
that “hacker culture speaks the intertwined languages of liberal
individualism and libertarianism and posits enlightened self-reliance and,
by necessary implication, technical meritocracy as cardinal virtues.”137
Many contracting parties are attuned to a broader range of values and
virtues. So too is contract law. Smart contracts are single-use tools. Legal
contracts serve both the parties and society in multiple ways at once.
Parties are likely to achieve better results by using a smart contract to
supplement their legal contract, rather than supplant it.
Conclusion
Smart contracts are the latest in a long line of new techniques
parties have invented to structure future-oriented exchanges. As has
happened before, lawmakers will need to adapt the existing law of contract
to these new forms of contracting.
This article has identified several limitations of smart contracts.
Smart contracts are not contractual writings, and should not be treated as
such. And code should figure into to the interpretive evidence of a legal
contract only in a narrow band of transactions: when the parties have
worked together to write the code and when sophisticated parties have
expressly incorporated it into the agreement. Even less often should code
displace other evidence of the parties’ actual agreement. More broadly, in
the vast majority of transactions, a smart contract will not do everything for
the parties that a legal contract can do. Parties are likely to achieve more
value when they use smart contract to supplement rather than supplant
their legal contracts. So too society as a whole.
None of this argues against the expanded use of smart contracts. A
smart contract is comparable to a surety bond in which S guarantees that A
will perform A’s legal contract with B. Like a smart contract, the bond can
help to solve the basic mistrust problem. Parties use surety bonds when
legal-contractual assurance of performance are, for one reason or another,
insufficient for their purposes. But no one would think that the surety bond
S provides does or should displace the legal contract between A and B. The
two work in tandem to maximize the value of the transaction to the parties.
The same should go for smart contracts.
Of course a smart contract can do much more than a surety bond.
By automating large parts of their transaction, perhaps using a distributed
ledger, parties might be able to achieve greater security and predictability at
a lower cost. But this new tool brings its own risks. A circular saw can
accomplish some jobs with greater speed and efficiency than can a hand
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saw. But no one accidently loses a finger to a hand saw. Contract law
provides a host of tools not only to do jobs that smart contracts cannot, but
that can protect parties against new risks smart contracts might generate.
The key is to understand how contract law can productively interface with
smart contracts, which has been the subject of this article.
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